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“REASONABLE” POLICE MISTAKES: 
FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AND THE 
“GOOD FAITH” EXCEPTION AFTER HEIEN 
KAREN MCDONALD HENNING† 
INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement officers will make mistakes: mistakes in 
judgment, mistakes in fact, and mistakes of law.  Officers are 
frequently asked to make split second decisions, and sometimes 
those decisions are wrong.1  Yet, because these decisions are 
necessary, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
police mistakes are inevitable and, to varying degrees, tolerated.  
First, the Fourth Amendment itself permits police officers to 
make mistakes and still satisfy the substantive demands of the 
Amendment.2  Second, even when officers violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court has ruled that the violation may not have 
a civil remedy.  When individuals bring suits for violations of 
their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of 
qualified immunity shields police officers from liability when 
their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional 
right.3  Lastly, a criminal defendant is not able to obtain 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. Many 
thanks to Dean Phyllis L. Crocker for her thoughtful suggestions on this article and 
to Nadia Maraachli for her tremendous support as a research assistant. Thank you 
as well the editorial staff of the St. John’s Law Review for their assistance with this 
article, and in particular, thank you to Stephen DiMaria, Anna Menkova, Jacqueline 
Wild, Thomas Rossidis, and Kaitlin Decker. 
1 The consequences of these wrong judgments range from inconveniences to 
tragedies, such as the Cleveland police officer who killed a twelve-year-old boy who 
had a toy gun in a park in November 2014. See Emma G. Fizsimmons, 12 Year Old 
Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/us/boy-12-dies-after-being-shot-by-cleveland-police-
officer.html). 
2 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
3 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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suppression of evidence illegally seized if the “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies.4  In all three 
situations, the Court calls for a determination of whether the 
mistake made by the officer was one that can be called 
“objectively reasonable.”5  Yet, what the Court means by the term 
objectively reasonable varies, and this variance sows confusion. 
The confusion over what constitutes an objectively 
reasonable mistake has become more pronounced with the 
Court’s decision in Heien v. North Carolina.6  Until this decision, 
the lower federal courts—save the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—had refused to extend the Fourth 
Amendment’s tolerance of mistakes to police errors about 
statutory proscriptions in their jurisdiction.7  Thus, where police 
officers’ actions were based on mistakes regarding the 
substantive law in their jurisdiction, the federal courts had 
concluded that the police officer’s conduct was not consistent with 
the demands of the Fourth Amendment.8  Moreover, the federal 
courts had refused to extend the good faith exception to such 
mistakes of law.9 
 
 
4 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
5 Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88; Leon, 468 U.S. at 926; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
6 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 
7 See United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. King, 244 
F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 
1998). But see United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005)) (“[T]he validity of a stop 
depends on whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, 
whether of law or fact, was an objectively reasonable one.”). 
8 Indeed, one of the foremost authorities on Fourth Amendment law, Professor 
Wayne LaFave, wrote in 2004 that “it is well-established Fourth Amendment 
doctrine that the sufficiency of the claimed probable cause must be determined by 
considering the conduct and circumstances deemed relevant within the context of 
the actual meaning of the applicable substantive provision, rather than the officer’s 
claimed interpretation of that statute.” Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” 
From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1847–48 (2004). 
9 Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279–80; United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
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In December 2014, however, the Supreme Court ruled 8–1 in 
Heien v. North Carolina10 that the demands of the Fourth 
Amendment can be satisfied when the officer acts based on a 
mistake regarding the scope of a substantive law.  Reasoning 
that reasonable individuals may make mistakes of law as well as 
fact, the Court concluded that when a stop is based on a police 
officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of substantive law, that 
stop complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.11  
At the same time, both the majority opinion and the concurrence 
were careful to distinguish the standard for determining whether 
the mistake was reasonable for purposes of a Fourth Amendment 
claim from what they clearly viewed as the more permissive 
standard for determining whether an officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity.12  Notably absent from the majority and 
concurring opinions was any discussion of the relationship 
between reasonable mistakes under the Fourth Amendment and 
mistakes that are reasonable for purposes of the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. 
Given Heien’s distinction between the standard under the 
Fourth Amendment and the standard for qualified immunity, we 
are left after Heien with the conclusion that the concept of 
“objectively reasonable” conduct varies depending on the type of 
claim the Court is addressing.  In particular, Heien leaves open 
both the question of what constitutes a reasonable mistake of law 
for Fourth Amendment purposes and the question of how that 
answer relates to the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  This Article explores these questions.  Part I examines how 
the Court has increased its tolerance of police mistakes, both in 
addressing Fourth Amendment claims and in the remedial 
doctrines of qualified immunity and the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule, and it ends with an examination of the 
Heien decision.  Part II reviews and evaluates the lower courts’ 
application of Heien from December 2014 through December 
2015 on both the substantive Fourth Amendment claims and the 
good faith exception.  This review concludes that while many 
courts are showing too much deference to police error on 
substantive Fourth Amendment claims, they also are correctly 
not considering the good faith exception once they conclude that 
 
10 135 S. Ct. at 540. 
11 Id. at 539. 
12 Id.; id. at 540–41 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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there was an unreasonable mistake of law by the police.  In 
short, an unreasonable mistake of law renders the good faith 
exception not applicable.  Part III considers the implications of 
this conclusion for the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule and concludes that Heien—a decision that expands 
toleration of police error—could also paradoxically provide a 
possible limiting principle to the expansive language that the 
Court has used in its most recent good faith exception cases. 
I. THE EVOLVING TOLERANCE OF POLICE MISTAKES 
In carrying out their duties, police may make a variety of 
mistakes.  They may misapprehend the facts—for example, 
mistaking the identity of an individual and arresting the wrong 
person.  They may make a mistake in the reach of the 
substantive prohibition—for example, thinking that the law 
requires two working brake lights, when the law only requires 
one light to be working.  They may make a mistake as to what 
the Fourth Amendment requires, such as concluding that the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement 
permits warrantless searches of cellphones found on the arrestee.  
As the law has evolved, the United States Supreme Court has 
distinguished mistakes of fact—and now as a result of Heien, 
mistakes about statutory proscriptions—from mistakes about the 
dictates of the Fourth Amendment for purposes of a substantive 
Fourth Amendment claim. 
The Court has also distinguished whether there is a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment from the question of whether there is a 
remedy for that violation.  Even when there is a Fourth 
Amendment violation, the violation may not result in a remedy.  
When examining whether a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to pursue 
a claim against an officer, the Court essentially applies a double 
reasonableness test.  The plaintiff must show not only that the 
conduct was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, but that the conduct could not have been 
reasonably believed to be constitutional.13  Similarly, with the 
 
13 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“[E]ven if a court were to hold 
that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable, 
warrantless search, Anderson sill operates to grant officers immunity for reasonable 
mistakes as to the legality of their actions.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Karen 
M. Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests and Searches in the Context of Qualified 
Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 786 (2009) (noting that layering the qualified 
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expansion of the good faith exception, the Court appears to be 
developing a double reasonableness standard for purposes of the 
exclusionary rule.  The Court has accepted in the good faith 
exception cases that there was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and it has gone on to evaluate whether that 
mistake was objectively reasonable.14  This Part traces the 
evolution of the Court’s understanding of acceptable mistakes in 
Fourth Amendment law, qualified immunity, and the good faith 
exception.  It ends with a description of Heien and its 
understanding of the role of mistakes in evaluating Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Accommodation of Reasonable 
Mistakes 
The Fourth Amendment has historically been read as 
requiring the government to obtain a warrant before engaging in 
a search or seizure.  As the Supreme Court repeated as recently 
as last year, warrantless searches “are per se 
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.”15  Notwithstanding this 
admonition, many searches and seizures are in fact lawfully 
 
immunity standard over the Fourth Amendment reasonableness question “gives the 
officer a second, if not a third, bite at the apple, because the substantive standard 
under the Fourth Amendment is very deferential towards the officer, taking into 
consideration the totality of the circumstances”). A number of observers have argued 
that this double reasonableness test unjustifiably expands the scope of qualified 
immunity, and in so doing, limits the effectiveness of § 1983 in deterring official 
misconduct and compensating victims for violations of their constitutional rights. 
See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 583 (1998); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 
229 (2006); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009); 
Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2007). 
14 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240 (2011). The Court has similarly 
limited the reach of Fourth Amendment law through its restrictions on the 
availability of the exclusionary rule. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double 
Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 617–18 
(2014); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New 
Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 638 (2014); Tracey Maclin & Jennifer 
Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe To Take Out the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L. REV. 1183, 1201–10 (2012); 
Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 
687, 732–33 (2011). 
15 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). 
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conducted without a warrant.16  Consequently, as the Supreme 
Court is fond of reminding us, “the ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ”17  Thus, for example, 
law enforcement officials are excused from the need to obtain a 
warrant before entering a home when there is probable cause to 
believe that there are exigent circumstances requiring police 
action,18 and they may stop and search a vehicle when there is 
probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in the 
vehicle.19  Moreover, police may stop individuals without a 
warrant under Terry v. Ohio20 when they have a reasonable 
suspicion that the individual engaged in or was about to engage 
in a crime, and they may also frisk the person if there is reason 
to believe the individual is armed and dangerous.21 
In fact, both the definition of probable cause—a “fair 
probability” that a crime has been committed22—and the 
definition of reasonable suspicion—“articulable facts” indicating 
that a crime has been committed, but less than the evidence 
necessary for probable cause23—anticipate that the police officer 
may well be wrong in her assessment of the facts.  Thus, in 
evaluating whether a warrantless search or seizure—and the 
scope of any search—was consistent with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court has assessed the reasonableness 
of the officer’s conduct in light of the information available to the 
officer.24  Consequently, the Court has concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated when information becomes available 
after the fact that shows that the officer was mistaken about the 
facts.25  Nor is the Fourth Amendment violated when there is not 
support for the arrested offense, but there is probable cause for 
 
16 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (noting that “warrantless 
searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant”). 
17 Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
18 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (noting these exigent 
circumstances include entry to protect the safety of officers or the public, entry in 
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, and entry to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence). 
19 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
20 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
21 Id. at 27–28. 
22 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
23 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 30–38. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 45–48. 
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some offense that the accused could have been charged with.  In 
these situations, the Court has held that the reasonableness of 
the officer’s conduct, viewed from an objective standard, permits 
the allowance of mistakes. 
The Court’s acceptance of police mistakes began in Brinegar 
v. United States,26 where the Court explored the limitations 
involved in the standard for probable cause.  The Court 
emphasized that the probable cause standard “deal[s] with 
probabilities”27 and requires that the police be given “fair leeway” 
in enforcing the law.28  Thus, the Court concluded, “Because 
many situations which confront officers in the course of executing 
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed 
for some mistakes on their part.”29  However, the Court warned 
that not all mistakes would be accepted:  “[T]he mistakes must be 
those of reasonable men.”30 
Based on this understanding of reasonable mistakes, the 
Court has held that the police complied with the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in several cases where 
the police turned out to have been wrong in their understanding 
of the facts.  First, in Hill v. California,31 the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment provided the police with “fair leeway” when 
the police had probable cause to arrest one person but arrested 
another individual on the belief that the second person was the 
first one.32  Although the Court recognized that the subjective 
beliefs of the arresting officers could not justify the search and 
that the officers were “quite wrong” as to the identity of the 
arrestee, the Court also concluded that the officers did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because the mistake of identity was a 
 
26 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
27 Id. at 175. 
28 Id. at 176. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
32 Id. In Hill, the police had probable cause to arrest Mr. Hill for robbery, went 
to Mr. Hill’s apartment, and arrested the individual who answered the door. The 
individual turned out to be a man named Miller, who matched the description given 
to the police of Hill. The Court held that the arrest of Miller was supported by 
probable cause, and therefore, the gun and ammunition the police found on the 
living room table were not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 799–
801. 
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reasonable one.33  Second, the Court held in Maryland v. 
Garrison34 that the Fourth Amendment provided fair leeway 
when the police mistakenly searched the wrong apartment 
pursuant to a warrant that was premised on the belief that there 
was only one apartment on the third floor of a building.35  
Finally, the Court explored the role of factual accuracy and 
mistakes in Illinois v. Rodriguez,36 and it concluded that the 
police may rely on a third party’s consent to enter a property 
when the facts available to the police at the time of entry would 
lead a reasonable police officer to believe the third party had 
authority over the premises.37  In Rodriguez, the Court reiterated 
that the Fourth Amendment commands “not that [officers] 
always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”38 
 
 
33 Id. at 804 (explaining that “probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment”). 
34 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
35 Id. In Garrison, the police obtained a warrant supported by probable cause for 
the apartment of the third floor of a building occupied by a man named McWebb. 
They realized after they had entered an apartment and discovered drugs that there 
were two apartments on the third floor and that they had entered the apartment not 
authorized by the warrant. Id. at 80. The Garrison Court extended the reasoning in 
Hill to conclude that “the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was 
unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant.” Id. at 85. Rather, 
as in Hill, the Court stated that the issue was whether the officer’s factual 
misunderstanding was “objectively understandable and reasonable.” Id. at 88. 
36 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990). 
37 Id. at 188. In Rodriguez, the police went to an apartment where they found a 
woman who showed signs of a severe beating. Id. at 179. The woman stated that 
Rodriguez had assaulted her earlier in the day. Id. She went with the police to 
Rodriguez’s apartment, and she used her key to the apartment to let the police in. 
Id. Once in Rodriguez’s apartment, they saw cocaine and drug paraphernalia in 
plain view in the living room. Id. at 180. They moved into the bedroom where they 
found Rodriguez asleep and more drugs. Id. at 179–80. Rodriguez moved to suppress 
the drugs on the grounds that the woman had no authority to consent to the entry by 
the police. Id. at 180. The Court agreed that the woman did not in fact have 
authority to consent to the entry because she had moved out of the apartment a 
month before the entry, her name was not on the lease for the apartment, and she 
did not contribute to the rent. Id. at 181. Nonetheless, the Court held that the search 
could be upheld if a reasonable officer would have believed that the woman had 
authority to consent to the entry. Id. at 188. 
38 Id. at 185 (“[W]e have not held that the Fourth Amendment requires factual 
accuracy.”). In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, the Court 
emphasized that the standard was an objective one judged from the perspective of 
an officer “of reasonable caution.” Id. at 188. 
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The Court’s tolerance for mistakes was expanded beyond 
factual errors in Michigan v. DeFillippo39 to include situations in 
which an officer had facts indicating a violation of a statute that 
was later deemed to be unconstitutionally vague.40  In reaching 
the conclusion that such an arrest was supported by probable 
cause, the Court relied on the same distinction between the 
standards required for a valid arrest and the standards for a 
conviction that the Court pointed to in Brinegar.41  Because there 
was no indication that the police officer should have known that 
the statute was unconstitutional, the Court concluded that the 
mistake—an arrest based on an unconstitutional statute—did 
not necessitate the conclusion that the arrest lacked probable 
cause.42  The Court rested this conclusion on the rationale that it 
was not in the public interest for police officers to decide whether 
to enforce a law based on the officer’s evaluation of the 
constitutionality of the statute.43  Thus, the Court held that the 
arrest was valid when the officer had sufficient facts to conclude 
that there was probable cause to believe that the individual 
violated a statute that had not been declared to be 
unconstitutional, at least where the statute was not “so grossly 
and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable 
prudence would be bound to see its flaws.”44 
The Court has also extended the leeway provided to police 
officers under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard 
to situations in which there is probable cause to arrest for some 
offense, regardless of the actual motivations of the officers or the 
offense for which the accused was actually arrested.  In Whren v. 
United States,45 the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the 
stop of his vehicle should be found unconstitutional because the 
claimed offense was a pretext for a stop actually motivated by the 
officer’s belief—unsupported by probable cause—that the driver 
and passenger were engaged in illegal drug dealing.46  The Court 
 
39 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
40 Id. at 39–40. 
41 Id. at 36. 
42 Id. at 35–36. 
43 Id. at 38 (“Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon 
themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled 
to enforcement.”). 
44 Id. 
45 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
46 Id. at 815–16, 819. 
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found that the actual motivation of the police officer involved was 
constitutionally irrelevant;47 what mattered was whether there 
was probable cause based on the facts for a reasonable officer to 
conclude an offense occurred.48  And, in Devenpeck v. Alford,49 the 
Court extended this logic to hold that whether there was 
probable cause for the arrest depends on whether the facts 
known to the arresting officer provided probable cause for an 
offense, regardless of the actual charge cited by the arresting 
officer at the time of the arrest.50 
In both Whren and Devenpeck, the Court expressly eschewed 
any evaluation of the subjective intent of the police officers.51  
Instead, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the 
reasonableness standard required the courts to apply objective 
standards of conduct.52  Inquiry into the subjective intent of the 
officer involved could render arrests made under the same set of 
facts vary in their consequences,53 and this result would be 
contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s command that the conduct 
of government officials be objectively reasonable.54  Thus, as long 
 
47 Id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”). As Professor LaFave pointed out, the analysis done 
by the Court in Whren leaves much to be desired. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1859. 
While it is clear that all members of the Court rejected an inquiry into the motives of 
the particular officer, it is by no means clear why the subjective motivations should 
be deemed irrelevant in analyzing whether a stop was reasonable. Id. at 1854–58. 
Indeed, as Professor LaFave concluded, the Court’s analysis in the case in essence 
“trivialize[d] what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a pervasive 
law-enforcement practice.” Id. at 1859. 
48 Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Moreover, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, a driver 
was arrested and taken to jail for a misdemeanor offense that did not have the 
possibility of jail time as a punishment. 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). The Court 
concluded that the arrest was consistent with the Fourth Amendment because once 
an officer has probable cause to believe an individual “has committed even a very 
minor criminal offense,” that individual may be arrested as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment law even if the arrest is not authorized under state law. Id. at 354. 
49 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
50 Id. at 152–54. 
51 See supra notes 47 and 50 and accompanying text. 
52 E.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with 
‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, 
whatever the subjective intent.”); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) 
(“[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective 
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of 
mind of the officer.”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“[T]he 
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their 
conclusions of probability.”). 
53 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154. 
54 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990). 
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as the facts provide probable cause for an arrest for some crime 
in the jurisdiction, the arrest complies with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In short, the “fair leeway” that the Court first provided to 
law enforcement in the Brinegar decision has evolved into a 
“reasonableness” inquiry with substantial allowance for error.  
Indeed, as Professors Kamin and Marceau recently noted, the 
current approach to Fourth Amendment claims “tends to skew in 
favor of government conduct at the expense of individual 
liberty.”55  Moreover, at the same time as the Court was reading 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment in a manner that 
favored the government, the Court also restricted the availability 
of relief both in the context of civil law suits seeking redress for 
constitutional violations and in criminal prosecutions.56  Thus, as 
is shown in the next section, even when the Fourth Amendment 
did not tolerate police officers’ errors, the Court has shielded 
many of those errors from any real consequences with two 
remedial doctrines: the doctrine of qualified immunity and the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
B. The Evolution of Qualified Immunity and Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
In 1961, the Supreme Court issued two seminal decisions 
involving the enforcement in federal constitutional rights: 
Monroe v. Pape,57 which permitted victims of constitutional 
violations to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain a federal remedy in 
federal courts, and Mapp v. Ohio,58 which extended the 
exclusionary rule to the states.  Both decisions saw remedies as 
an essential part of the rights and drew from the pronouncement 
in Marbury v. Madison59 that where there is a right, there is a 
remedy.60  Yet, as both qualified immunity and the good faith 
 
55 Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 618. 
56 Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENVER U. L. REV. 
317, 326–30 (2012); Pamela S. Karlan, The Transformation of Judicial Self-
Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 607, 611–13 (2012); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, 
Enforcing Rights, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 306, 314–16 (2015). 
57 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
58 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
59 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
60 Id. at 163 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.”). As Professor Harmon explained in her article, the Monroe v. Pape and 
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exception have evolved, the constitutional right and the remedy 
for violations of those rights have been consciously decoupled.  
This decoupling, in turn, has led to a situation in which 
constitutional violations do not necessarily result in any 
consequences for the government. 
1. The Origins of Qualified Immunity and the Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
From early in the modern civil rights era, the Court 
recognized that the doctrine of qualified immunity was a 
necessary restriction in § 1983 cases to protect societal interests 
in ensuring that official decision making was not skewed by fear 
of liability for any mistake.61  At the same time, the Court 
recognized that inherent in the granting officials immunity was a 
balance of evils between the vindication of constitutional rights 
and the social costs of subjecting officials to liability.62  The Court 
had originally envisioned qualified immunity as a doctrine that 
protected those who either acted in good faith63 or objectively did 
not or should not have known that their conduct violated a 
 
Mapp decisions were based on the Court’s judgment that local and state 
governments had failed to adequately protect individuals from police misconduct. 
Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012). By 
expanding the exclusionary rule to the states, and by permitting victims of police 
overreaching to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court, in Professor Harmon’s 
opinion, “allocated wholesale the responsibility for solving the problem of policing to 
courts and promoted the regulation of the police primarily by constitutional 
adjudication.” Id. Even if Professor Harmon’s account is arguably overstated, there 
is no doubt that she is correct in asserting that the Warren Court saw the remedies 
it adopted in the Mapp and Monroe v. Pape decisions as essential for ensuring that 
the constitutional rights of citizens were respected. See Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-
Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First 
Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 882 (2010). 
61 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974) (“Implicit in the idea that 
officials have some immunity—absolute or qualified—for their acts, is a recognition 
that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume 
that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to 
decide or act at all.”). 
62 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982). The Court recognized in this 
decision that “an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for 
vindication of constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 814. At the same time, the Court 
enumerated the costs to both the individual officials and “to society as a whole.” Id. 
As the Court explained, “[t]hese social costs include the expenses of litigation, the 
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able 
citizens from acceptance of public office,” as well as the threat to the official decision-
making will be made with an eye toward potential liability. Id. 
63 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 245–46. 
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constitutional right.64  However, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,65 the 
Court rejected this good faith standard because it permitted 
“bare allegations of malice” to force officials to participate in 
litigation and face potential liability.66  In order to provide 
sufficient protections for government officials, the Harlow Court 
concluded that officials should be “shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”67  Thus, after Harlow, in 
order to avoid the bar of qualified immunity, a § 1983 plaintiff 
had to make a two part showing: (1) his or her constitutional 
rights were violated, and (2) the right was clearly established at 
the time of the violation.68 
Two years after the Court decided Harlow, the Court 
recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
United States v. Leon.69  As Professor Laurin has shown, the Leon 
decision borrowed significantly from the Harlow decision and 
envisioned a similar two-step process in which the finding of a 
constitutional violation was separated from any remedial 
consequences for that violation.70  In Leon, a search had been 
conducted pursuant to a warrant that was later determined to 
lack probable cause, and the question before the Court was 
whether there should be an exception to the exclusionary rule to 
permit the introduction of the evidence seized pursuant to the 
warrant later found to be defective.71  In answering this question, 
the Court began its analysis by distinguishing the issue of 
whether the Fourth Amendment was violated from the question 
of whether the exclusion of evidence was appropriate.72  The 
Court justified this decoupling by citing the “substantial social 
costs exacted by the exclusionary rule.”73  Moreover, although the 
 
64 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). 
65 457 U.S. 800. 
66 Id. at 817–18. 
67 Id. at 818. 
68 See id. 
69 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
70 Jennifer Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 699–704 (2011). See Maclin & Rader, supra 
note 14, at 1211–14, for a similar discussion. 
71 Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. 
72 Id. at 906. 
73 Id. at 907. Amongst these perceived social costs were the interference with 
the adversary system’s truth-seeking function by excluding relevant evidence, the 
FINAL_HENNING 10/12/2016  8:37 AM 
284 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:271   
Court in Mapp v. Ohio74 has justified the extension of the 
exclusionary rule to the states as “an essential part of both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,”75 the Leon decision 
emphasized that the exclusionary rule was simply a “judicially 
created remedy” that was designed to deter illegal conduct rather 
than provide a right to individuals.76  After decoupling the 
exclusionary rule from the Constitution and limiting the 
justification for the rule to deterrence, the Court recognized a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that permitted the 
introduction of evidence when the police obtained evidence 
pursuant to a facially valid warrant, even if it was later 
determined that the warrant was not valid under Fourth 
Amendment standards.77 
Despite the nomenclature of a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, the Leon Court made clear that, as was the 
case with the Harlow qualified immunity standard, the officer’s 
own subjective beliefs were irrelevant for purposes of the 
exception.  Rather, the question to be answered was whether the 
conduct of the police officer was objectively reasonable.78  The 
Leon Court acknowledged that it had recently eliminated the 
subjective inquiry in qualified immunity cases in its Harlow 
decision.79  And, the Court explained that under the test it was 
adopting in suppression cases, the “good faith inquiry is confined 
to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably 
well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal 
despite the magistrate’s authorization.”80  It is not difficult to see 
how this language mirrors Harlow’s language that qualified  
 
 
risk that some guilty could go free, and the fear that insistence on the application of 
the exclusionary rule “may well ‘generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration 
of justice.’ ” Id. at 908 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)). 
74 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
75 Id. at 657. The Mapp Court saw the exclusionary rule as not only deterring 
police misconduct, but as promoting the integrity of the judiciary. Id. at 656, 659. 
76 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. 
77 Id. at 913. On the same day that the Court issued Leon, the Court issued 
another decision in which it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence 
seized pursuant to a warrant when the judge had forgotten to make “clerical 
corrections” to that warrant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984). 
78 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 (“We emphasize that the standard of 
reasonableness we adopt is an objective one.”). 
79 Id. at 922 n.23. 
80 Id. 
FINAL_HENNING 10/12/2016  8:37 AM 
2016] “REASONABLE” POLICE MISTAKES 285 
immunity does not protect an official when the “official could be 
expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or 
constitutional rights.”81 
2. The Evolution of Qualified Immunity Doctrine 
As originally formulated by Harlow, the qualified immunity 
“clearly established” standard placed responsibility on officials to 
ascertain the limits of lawful conduct.  The Court explained, “If 
the law [is] clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily 
should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should 
know the law governing his conduct.”82  Moreover, Harlow 
acknowledged that “[t]he greater power of [high] officials . . . [the] 
greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct,” and therefore, 
“[d]amages actions . . . were . . . ‘an important means of 
vindicating constitutional guarantees.’ ”83  Yet, Harlow also 
justified its revised qualified immunity test on the perceived 
negative impact of litigation and potential liability on officials 
and the public.84  Thus, three years after the Harlow decision, the 
Court determined that qualified immunity was a legal question 
because of the need to dismiss cases as quickly as possible where 
liability was not warranted.85  The following year, in Malley v. 
 
81 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). 
82 Id. at 818–19. 
83 Id. at 809 (citations omitted). 
84 Id. 
85 See generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). In this case, the Court 
announced that whether there was a clearly established right was “essentially [a] 
legal question” and that this question should be answered before subjecting officials 
to substantial discovery. Id at 526. Yet, there was a tension in qualified immunity 
cases between vindicating constitutional rights by providing a remedy to victims and 
shielding officials from the negative impact of potential litigation and liability. As 
Justice Blackmun wrote, § 1983 “stands for . . . the commitment of our society to be 
governed by law and to protect the rights of those without power against oppression 
at the hands of the powerful.” Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal 
Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1985). Thus, while the Supreme Court warned of the perils of 
litigation in cases such as Mitchell v. Forsyth, there were also several cases in which 
the Court equated the qualified immunity standard to the “fair warning” standard 
used to evaluate whether a statute was unconstitutionally vague. In United States v. 
Lanier, the Court rejected a state judge’s claim that he could not be prosecuted 
under the criminal analog to § 1983 for sexually assaulting women who went to his 
chambers on the ground that there had been no prosecutions for such conduct and 
therefore he was not on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right. 
See generally 520 U.S. 259 (1997). The Court rejected this argument on the grounds 
that “the qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning 
standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from 
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Briggs,86 the Court reassured the police officers who were seeking 
absolute immunity that the qualified immunity standard would 
be sufficiently protective of their interests, explaining that “[a]s  
the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample 
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”87 
Between 1986 and 2011, when the Supreme Court decided 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,88 Malley’s language of “the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” appeared 
sporadically in qualified immunity decisions.89  For example, in 
Hunter v. Bryant90 and Burns v. Reed,91 the Court used the quote 
to explain that the standard of qualified immunity is quite 
protective of government officials.92  In addition, several dissents 
used the quote to object to the majority’s decision to permit a 
§ 1983 suit to move forward or to hold the government officials 
liable.93  But, in the vast majority of qualified immunity cases, 
the Court quoted the basic standard from Harlow that officials  
 
 
civil liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed in 
the face of vague criminal statutes.” Id. at 270–71. Similarly, in Hope v. Pelzer, a 
case in which a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action for prison guards tying him to 
a hitching post for seven hours on a hot Alabama summer day, the Court explained 
that a right is clearly established when it is “obvious” that officials have “fair 
warning that their conduct violated the Constitution.” 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
86 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
87 Id. at 341. 
88 563 U.S. 731 (2011). 
89 See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam). 
90 Id. 
91 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991). 
92 In Burns, the Court rejected a prosecutor’s claim that he was entitled to 
absolute immunity for giving police advice on the legality of hypnotizing a witness 
before obtaining her statement. Id. In Hunter, the Court in a per curiam decision 
held that Secret Service agents were entitled to qualified immunity for arresting an 
individual for threatening the plaintiff, even if they were mistaken about whether 
there was probable cause supporting the arrest. 502 U.S. at 227. As the Court 
explained, the agents’ decision was “reasonable, even if mistaken.” Id. at 229. In 
Saucier v. Katz, the Court cited to Malley and used the quote in a parenthetical. 533 
U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Curiously, however, the parenthetical was used to support the 
Court’s understanding that the purpose of the qualified immunity protection was to 
assure that the official was “on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful.” 
Id. 
93 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 429 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 752 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); McCleary v. Navarro, 504 U.S. 966, 967 (1992) (White, J., dissenting 
from denial of petition for writ of certiorari). 
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are protected by qualified immunity unless their conduct 
“violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”94 
The Court made clear, as the qualified immunity doctrine 
evolved, that qualified immunity shielded officials from liability 
for legal errors as well as factual mistakes as long as these 
mistakes were reasonable ones.95  As the Court noted, qualified 
immunity provided a shield to officers who made “mere mistakes 
in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.”96  
Moreover, the Court made clear that the qualified immunity 
standard was an objective test in which the subjective intent of 
the official at issue was irrelevant.97  In fact, the Court’s general 
approach to qualified immunity made a number of commentators 
concerned with the approach that the Court was taking on the 
grounds that it was insufficiently protective of constitutional 
rights.98  Indeed, the doctrine worked to require § 1983 plaintiffs 
to show that the defendant officer was “doubly unreasonable” 
when the constitutional claim incorporated the concept of 
reasonableness.  For example, in order to defeat a claim of 
qualified immunity in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim, 
the plaintiff had to show not only that the officer conducted an 
 
94 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Wilson v. Layne, 526 
U.S. 603, 614 (1999). 
95 Harlow, 457 U.S.at 818 (“If the law at that time was not clearly established, 
an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal 
developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not 
previously identified as unlawful.”). 
96 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 641 (1993) (“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement 
officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause 
is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials—like other 
officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held 
personally liable.”); Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (“Qualified 
immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if 
constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the 
circumstances she confronted.”). 
97 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (“The relevant 
question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable 
officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly 
established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Anderson’s 
subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.”). 
98 See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 13, at 624–34; Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures 
and the Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 
889, 910–11 (2010); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding 
Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1217–26 (2005). 
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unreasonable search, but that the officer’s understanding of what 
was reasonable was unreasonable.99  Yet, the Court continued to 
reiterate that the issue in qualified immunity cases was the basic 
Harlow standard: what an objectively reasonable officer would 
have concluded.100 
In 2011, when the Court decided al-Kidd, however, the Court 
elevated the Malley phrase to something of a rallying cry.  In al-
Kidd, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision permitting 
a § 1983 suit to go forward against Attorney General Ashcroft for 
authorizing the use of the federal material-witness statute to 
detain individuals suspected of terrorist activities.101  Because 
the Court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation, it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the question 
of whether the conduct violated clearly established law, and yet 
the Court also examined this question.102  And, in reaching this 
second question, the Court made clear that, at least on the 
rhetorical level, “plainly incompetent or knowingly criminal” was 
the standard for evaluating whether the official had violated 
clearly established law.103  The conclusion of the decision tellingly 
includes these words: 
Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room 
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal 
questions.  When properly applied, it protects “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”  
Ashcroft deserves neither label.104 
 
99 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“[E]ven if a court were to hold 
that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable, 
warrantless search, Anderson still operates to grant officers immunity for reasonable 
mistakes as to the illegality of their actions.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
659 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has decided to apply a double 
standard of reasonableness in damages actions against federal agents who are 
alleged to have violated an innocent citizen's Fourth Amendment rights. By double 
standard I mean a standard that affords a law enforcement official two layers of 
insulation from liability or other adverse consequence, such as suppression of 
evidence.”). 
100 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
101 See generally 563 U.S. 731 (2011). 
102 Id. at 740. In fact, three justices objected to reaching the Fourth Amendment 
claim in light of the conclusion that there was no clearly established law informing 
the Attorney General that the use of the material witness statute was unlawful. See 
id. at 745–47 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer and Sotomayor, concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 750–51 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, concurring 
in the judgment). 
103 Id. at 743. 
104 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Labeling an official “plainly incompetent” or “knowingly 
criminal” seems a far cry from Harlow’s focus on requiring 
officials to conform their conduct to established standards, at 
least rhetorically.  Since the decision in al-Kidd, the Court has 
repeated this standard of “plainly incompetent or knowingly 
criminal” to evaluate whether an official is entitled to the 
protections of qualified immunity.  In a number of cases, this 
rhetoric has become part of the opening explanation as to how 
qualified immunity operated.105  And perhaps not surprisingly, in 
each of the cases in which the Court has used this rhetorical 
flourish, the § 1983 claimant has not been able to defeat the 
claim of qualified immunity.106  Moreover, the Court in 
Messerschmidt instructed that where the official’s conduct is not 
knowing criminal, the evaluation of whether a mistake was 
“reasonable” for purposes of qualified immunity turns on whether 
the mistake rendered the official “plainly incompetent.”107  In 
short, rather than asking whether the official has acted in an 
objectively reasonable manner,108 the Court’s rhetoric in qualified 
immunity cases has taken on a cast of blameworthiness:  Is the 
official “knowingly criminal or plainly incompetent?” 
3. The Evolution of the Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule 
Just as the Court in qualified immunity cases moved from 
concerns about compensating those who suffered constitutional 
wrongs to concerns subjecting officials to the negative impact of 
litigation and liability, the Court in the good faith exception cases 
 
105 See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 
(2015); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 
348, 350 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244–45 (2012). 
106 In fact, in Stanton v. Sims, the Court noted that because “[t]here is no 
suggestion in this case that Officer Stanton knowingly violated the Constitution; the 
question is whether, in light of precedent existing at the time, he was ‘plainly 
incompetent.’ ” 134 S. Ct. at 5. 
107 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249 (“The officers’ judgment that the scope of 
the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was 
not ‘plainly incompetent.’ ”). As Professor Bendlin noted, this shift has moved the 
inquiry from whether the police acted in an objectively reasonable manner to 
whether the actions were not “entirely unreasonable.” Susan Bendlin, Qualified 
Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly Incompetent” (And Maybe Some of Them, 
Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1045 (2011) (quoting Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1249)). 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 78–81. 
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shifted from viewing suppression as an intrinsic part of the 
Fourth Amendment to concerns about the social costs of the 
exclusionary rule.  And, just as the rhetoric involved in § 1983 
decisions moved from “what a reasonable officer should know” to 
protection of all but the “knowingly criminal or plainly 
incompetent,” the Court has moved from an exception for 
evidence seized when the police conduct that at the time  
appeared to be “objectively reasonable” to an inquiry into 
whether there was “deliberate reckless or grossly negligent” 
misconduct to justify suppression of evidence.109 
As was the case with the qualified immunity decision in 
Harlow, the Court in Leon placed some onus on the police to 
ensure that their conduct was consistent with the demands of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Although the Leon Court concluded that 
evidence need not be suppressed where a warrant is later 
determined to be unsupported by probable cause, it also made 
clear that the exception to the suppression rule was premised on 
the police officer having acted with “objective good faith.”110  At 
the same time, the Leon opinion did introduce a connection 
between the suppression of evidence and the culpability of the 
police officer involved by noting that “an assessment of the 
flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step 
in the calculus” of determining whether the evidence should be 
suppressed.111  Leon also connected the culpability of police 
officers to the exclusion of evidence in concluding the 
exclusionary rule was appropriate when there was some sort of 
misconduct by the police either because the magistrate was 
misled in issuing the warrant or because the warrant was so 
facially deficient it was not reasonable for the officer to rely on 
the warrant in acting.112 
 
109 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011); Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009); see Jennifer E. Laurin, Messerschmidt and 
Convergence in Action: A Reply to Comments on Trawling for Herring, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 119, 121–22 (May 14, 2012); Maclin & Rader, supra note 14, at 1189–
91. 
110 Leon, 468 U.S. at 920. Although some commentators viewed the introduction 
of any exception to the exclusionary rule with some alarm, see, e.g., Albert W. 
Alschuler, “Close Enough for Government Work”: The Exclusionary Rule after Leon, 
1984 S. CT. REV. 309 (1984), Leon can be read as consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment’s preference for warrants. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 614. 
111 Leon, 468 U.S. at 911. 
112 Id. at 923. The Court made clear that there were situations in which a 
finding of “objective good faith” would not be warranted, including when the officer 
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A few years after Leon, in Illinois v. Krull,113 the Court held 
that the good faith exception applied to evidence seized by 
officers who relied on a statute that was later invalidated.114  
And, in Arizona v. Evans,115 the Court extended the good faith 
exception to a situation in which the police relied on a false 
report of an outstanding warrant transmitted from a judicial 
officer.116  Yet, by and large for many years, the good faith 
exception played a limited role in Fourth Amendment cases, and 
exclusion of evidence was the general rule.117  However, in the 
three most recent Supreme Court decisions on the good faith 
exception, Hudson v. Michigan,118 Herring v. United States,119 
and Davis v. United States,120 the Court has provided 
significantly more leeway for the government to use evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,121 just as the 
Court has provided more protection for officials in the qualified 
immunity arena. 
 
knew or should have known the information in the affidavit presented to the 
magistrate was false, when the magistrate had abandoned her objective role, when 
the affidavit clearly lacked probable cause, and where the warrant was facially 
invalid. Id. Moreover, the Court cautioned that the “objective reasonableness” of the 
police would be judged collectively to prevent an officer from obtaining a warrant on 
a “bare-bone[d] affidavit” and then relying on others to execute that warrant. Id. 
113 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
114 Id. at 350 (alteration in original) (“To paraphrase the Court’s comment in 
Leon: ‘Penalizing the officer for the [legislature’s] error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’ ”). 
115 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
116 Id. at 14–16. 
117 Marceau, supra note 14, at 745 (“For decades the rule was simple: if the 
Fourth Amendment was deemed violated, then exclusion was required, regardless of 
officer culpability.”). As Professor Marceau explained, the exclusionary rule was seen 
as an institutional remedy precluding the use of evidence against a defendant, not as 
punishment or liability for the individual officer involved. Id. at 745 n.289. 
118 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
119 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
120 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
121 In fact, many see this trilogy of cases as moving the good faith exception to 
the point of threatening to swallow the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See 
Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Court means what it now 
says, if it would place determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual 
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth 
Amendment violation was ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,’ then the ‘good 
faith’ exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.”); Ferguson, supra note 14, at 624 
(“The Supreme Court has recently directed a sustained legal assault against the 
exclusionary rule.”); Marceau, supra note 14, at 741; Maclin & Rader, supra note 14, 
at 1187–89. 
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In Hudson v. Michigan,122 the Court determined that 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s knock 
and announce requirement should not be subject to the 
exclusionary rule.123  The Court began its analysis of the question 
with the pronouncement:  “Suppression of evidence . . . has 
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”124  Although it 
acknowledged that Mapp had envisioned a much wider role for 
the exclusionary rule, the Court concluded that Mapp’s approach 
had already been rejected in favor of one in which evidence is 
only suppressed when the deterrent benefits of the rule outweigh 
the substantial social costs involved in suppressing the 
evidence.125  The potential impact of this decision on the 
exclusionary rule was tempered by the fact that both the 
majority and the concurrence stressed the lack of a causal 
connection between the failure to follow the knock and announce 
procedure and the seizure of the evidence.126  According to both 
the majority and concurring opinion, the seizure was caused by 
the execution of a valid search warrant rather than by the 
violation of the knock-and-announce procedure.127  Thus, some 
commentators concluded that Hudson was limited to a more 
causal connection analysis,128 a conclusion that seemed 
reasonable given Justice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically 




122 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
123 Id. at 591. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 591–92. As Professors Kamin and Marceau pointed out, this statement 
is one of “Orwellian revisionist history.” Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 616 
(pointing out the similarities in Hudson’s accounting of the Court’s approach to the 
exclusionary rule to George Orwell’s commentary that “Oceania has always been at 
war with Eurasia”). 
126 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592; id. at 603–04 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
127 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592–94 (majority opinion); id. at 603–04 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
128 See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States, A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 482 (2009); Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule 
Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4–5 (2012). 
129 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (“[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, 
as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.”). 
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The Herring decision signaled that Hudson was not so 
limited.130  In Herring, the police officer had arrested the 
defendant based on inaccurate information from another police 
department that the defendant had an outstanding warrant.131  
Although the Court could have concluded that the police officer 
was acting based on a mistake of fact, and therefore there was no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court accepted that 
there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and moved 
squarely to the question of whether the evidence found based on 
the unlawful arrest should be invalidated.132  Herring reiterated 
Hudson’s language cautioning against the use of the exclusionary 
rule and using the exclusionary rule only when the deterrent 
effect of excluding the evidence outweighed the social costs that 
result from the exclusion of evidence.133  The Court then 
expanded this cost-benefit approach to equate the culpability of 
the police officer with the deterrent impact of the application of 
the exclusionary rule.134  The Herring opinion drew support for 
this approach from language in Leon about the “flagrancy of the 
police misconduct.”135  However, in Leon, the Court was 
concerned with whether the officer was acting in an objectively 
reasonable manner.136  By contrast, in Herring, the Court shifted 
its focus, explaining that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police 
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”137  





130 Whether Herring deserves the expansive reading described in this Article or 
has a more minimal impact as commentators, such as Professor Alschuler, had 
hoped, see Alschuler, supra note 128, at 511–13, many commentators have concluded 
that Davis clearly saw Herring as evincving a pronounced antipathy toward the 
exclusionary rule. See Maclin & Rader, supra note 14, at 1205–07; Kit Kinports, 
Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
821, 830–32 (2013) [hereinafter Kinports, Culpability]. 
131 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009). 
132 Id. at 138–39. 
133 Id. at 140. 
134 Id. at 143. 
135 Id. at 144 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)). 
136 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 922–23. 
137 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
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Court explained it was looking for “deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or 
systemic negligence.”138 
The Court returned to this heightened rhetoric two years 
later in Davis v. United States.139  In Davis, the Court was faced 
with the question of how to handle a motion to suppress evidence 
when the search was lawful under binding precedent at the time 
of the search but was determined to be unconstitutional while 
the defendant’s case was on direct appeal.140  As a general rule, 
defendants may take advantage of a change in the law while 
their case is pending, and that is precisely what happened to 
Davis.141  Moreover, the Court recognized that as a consequence 
of this general rule of retroactivity, the search of Davis violated 
the Fourth Amendment; but, that did not mean that the evidence 
needed to be excluded.142 
 
138 Id. At the same time, the Court insisted that the test remained an objective 
test in which the subjective intent of the official was irrelevant. Id. at 145. 
Commentators have questioned how to apply a test that calls for an evaluation of 
reckless conduct without any subjective inquiry. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 640–41; 
Alschuler, supra note 128, at 483–88; Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and 
Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and 
Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 752–53 (2010) [hereinafter 
Kinsports, Reasonable Suspicion]. Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her 
Herring dissent, the assumption of the Court that the deterrence is not effective in 
cases where officers are negligent “runs counter to a foundational premise of tort 
law.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A number of commentators 
have agreed with this point. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 9; Kinports, Culpability, 
supra note 130, at 835–36. In fact, as Professors Kamin and Marceau recently wrote, 
“It seems almost unfair at this point to critique the logic of Herring—that negligent 
conduct cannot be deterred through sanctions.” Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 
617. 
139 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
140 Id. at 237. 
141 In Davis, the defendant’s car was searched based on the binding authority 
that permitted a search of the passenger compartment whenever a suspect was 
arrested in an automobile. In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court held that if the 
suspect is restrained, the search is limited to evidence related the offense for which 
the suspect was arrested. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). The defendant’s case in Davis was on 
direct appeal when Gant was decided, and thus, under ordinary principles of 
retroactivity, the defendant was entitled to apply Gant to his search. Davis, 564 U.S. 
at 252–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
142 While the Court acknowledged that the retroactivity principle required the 
conclusion that the search violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, it concluded 
that the evidence should not be suppressed because the “[r]etroactive application 
does not . . . determine what ‘appropriate remedy’ (if any) the defendant should 
obtain.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 241–43 (majority opinion). 
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The Davis Court continued its singular focus on deterrence 
as the only justification for the exclusionary rule;143 yet, it also 
cautioned that “[r]eal deterrent value is a ‘necessary condition for 
exclusion,’ but it is not ‘a sufficient’ one.”144  Rather, because the 
Court saw the “heavy toll” that the exclusionary rule plays on 
“both the judicial system and society at large,” the Court 
instructed that the “deterrence benefits of suppression must 
outweigh its heavy costs.”145  As it did in Herring, the Davis 
Court equated the deterrence value of suppression with the 
culpability of the police officer.146  The Court explained:  “[W]hen 
the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good faith belief’ 
that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only 
simple, ‘isolated’ negligence, the ‘ “deterrence rationale loses 
much of its force,” ’ and exclusion cannot ‘pay its way.’ ”147 
 
143 Id. at 236–237. Some members of the Court have refused to view the 
exclusionary rule as solely concerned about deterrence. As Justice Sotomayor 
recently wrote in her powerful dissent in Utah v. Strieff, the exclusionary rule not 
only deters police misconduct, “[i]t also keeps courts from being ‘made party to 
lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered 
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.” 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). See 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the exclusionary rule “also serves other 
important purposes: It ‘enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in 
official lawlessness,’ and it ‘assur[es] the people—all potential victims of unlawful 
government conduct—that the government would not profit from its lawless 
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in 
government’ ”)). 
144 Id. at 237 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006)). According 
to the Davis opinion, “Our cases hold that society must swallow this bitter pill when 
necessary, but only as a ‘last resort.’ ” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 591 (2006)). In the most recent Term, the Court reiterated its distaste for the 
exclusionary rule in a case involving the attenuation doctrine, a doctrine that 
permits fruits of unconstitutional police conduct to be admitted when the connection 
between the constitutional violation and the evidence is severed by an intervening 
event. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061. The majority began its discussion by quoting 
Hudson’s conclusion that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been our last 
resort, not our first impulse.” Id.  (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591). 
145 Davis, 564 U.S. at 237. 
146 Id. at 238 (explaining that the culpability required was “ ‘deliberate,’ 
‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights”) (quoting 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). 
147 Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (citations omitted). 
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4. The Connection Between the Qualified Immunity Standard 
and the Good Faith Exception 
In both the qualified immunity cases and the good faith 
exception cases, we see an escalation of rhetoric that favors the 
government as opposed to the victim of the constitutional 
violation.  Both standards began as a reasonable, good faith 
belief standard, measured through an objective lens as to what a 
reasonable officer would conclude under the circumstances.148  
And, both standards began with placing the onus on the officer to 
ensure that the conduct was consistent with the commands of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Just as the culpability required to defeat a 
claim of qualified immunity escalated to a showing that the 
official was “knowingly criminal or plainly incompetent,” the 
Court has announced that more than “simple, isolated 
negligence” must be found to exclude evidence—“deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” is required, at least where 
the actors involved in the constitutional error are not the 
investigators themselves.  Thus, both doctrines call for an 
objective evaluation of the facts, while simultaneously 
establishing a threshold of recklessness or worse, which typically 
involves an inquiry into a subjective state of mind.149 
Whether the two doctrines are in fact the same has been the 
subject of debate.150  While the two doctrines have developed 
largely independently of each other, both the qualified immunity 
doctrine and the good faith exception permit the government to 
violate the Fourth Amendment without providing the victim with 
a remedy.  Both doctrines employ the similar language of 
“reasonable mistakes” and require a degree of culpability by law 
enforcement.151  And, indeed, it is clear that the standards are 
 
148 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984). 
149 Laurin, supra note 70, at 727–28. 
150 In her article, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, Professor Laurin suggests that Herring’s approach to the exclusionary 
rule can be best understood in terms of the development of the qualified immunity 
doctrine. Id. at 720. Professor John M. Greabe disagreed with Professor Laurin in 
his response to this article, and in particular, her assessment of the qualified 
immunity doctrine. See John M. Greabe, Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring 
Good Faith Principle and the Harlow Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be 
Married, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 2–3 (2012). 
151 Although Professors Laurin and Greabe disagree about the contours of these 
two doctrines, they do agree that these doctrines share this common ground. Laurin, 
supra note 70, at 727–28; Greabe, supra note 150, at 5. 
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equivalents when the police conduct a search pursuant to a 
defective warrant.152  Given the overlap between the two 
doctrines, it seems reasonable to conclude that the two standards 
are rough equivalents.153  Whether this conclusion is accurate, 
however, is open to reconsideration in light of the Court’s 2014 
decision in Heien v. North Carolina,154 when the Court 
incorporated “objectively reasonable” mistakes of law into the 
concept of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.155 
C. The Heien Decision 
Notwithstanding the substantial leeway the Supreme Court 
provided to officers under the reasonableness standard of the 
Fourth Amendment, the federal circuits—save the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—refused to find that 
arrests based on a mistaken understanding of substantive law 
were consistent with the commands of the Fourth Amendment.  
Rather, the majority of lower federal courts concluded that 
warrantless searches or seizures based on police mistakes 
regarding substantive law were “objectively unreasonable.”156  In 
 
152 Although Justice White indicated in Leon that there might be some 
differences between the two standards, Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, in Malley v. 
Briggs (a qualified immunity case), Justice White wrote: “[T]he same standard of 
objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in 
Leon defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant 
allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.” 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). And, the 
Court reiterated this position in both the Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563–65 
(2004) and Messerschmidt v. Millender decisions. The Messerschmidt Court 
explained that “we have held that ‘the same standard of objective reasonableness 
that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified 
immunity accorded an officer’ who obtained or relied on an allegedly invalid 
warrant.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 n.1 (2012) (citations 
omitted). 
153 Laurin, supra note 70, at 710–11; see Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, 
and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1109 (2011) (alteration in 
original) (“As the Supreme Court has made clear, the traditional standard of the 
good faith exception evaluates the second question by using a familiar test from 
qualified immunity law. Where the good faith exception applies, it adopts ‘the same 
standard of objective reasonableness that . . . defines the qualified immunity 
accorded an officer’ in a civil case.”). But see Greabe, supra note 150, at 7–8 
(objecting to Professor Laurin’s equation of the two doctrines as threatening to 
restrict the availability of remedies for constitutional torts). 
154 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 
155 Id. at 538. 
156 United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Although 
an officer's mistake of fact can still justify a probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
determination for a traffic stop, an officer's mistake of law cannot.”); see United 
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addition, in these cases, the lower federal courts rejected the 
government’s attempt to use the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule to allow the admission of the evidence.157 
The lower federal courts rejected the government’s attempt 
to extend the allowance for reasonable mistakes of fact to include 
reasonable mistakes of law on the grounds that law enforcement 
officials had the responsibility to know the law.158  The courts 
reasoned that accepting substantive mistakes of law as 
consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements would remove 
incentives for police to make sure they understand the 
substantive law they are enforcing.159 As the Fifth Circuit 
explained in one of the earliest decisions on this issue, the 
Supreme Court decisions gave officers “broad leeway to conduct 
searches and seizures . . . the flip side of that leeway is that the 
legal justification must be objectively grounded.”160  Moreover, 
 
States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“provides law enforcement officers broad leeway to conduct searches and 
seizures . . . [b]ut the flip side of that leeway is that the legal justification must be 
objectively grounded”); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“A stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation 
actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable”); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 
1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person 
charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable.”); United States v. 
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] mistake of law cannot 
provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop.”); United 
States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Even a good faith mistake of law 
by an officer cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion.”). But see United States 
v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he validity of a stop depends on 
whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in 
mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or fact, 
was an objectively reasonable one.”). Indeed, one of the foremost authorities on 
Fourth Amendment law, Professor Wayne LaFave, wrote in 2004 that “it is well-
established Fourth Amendment doctrine that the sufficiency of the claimed probable 
cause must be determined by considering the conduct and circumstances deemed 
relevant within the context of the actual meaning of the applicable substantive 
provision, rather than the officer’s claimed interpretation of that statute.” LaFave, 
supra note 8, at 1847–48. 
157 Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279–80; United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
158 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242 (“[R]equiring law enforcement personnel to know 
the law they are asked to enforce comports with a basic policy of fairness”); United 
States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d, 1134, 1137 n.2 (holding that “failure to 
understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively 
reasonable”). 
159 E.g., Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242; Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106. 
160 United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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the courts concluded that extending the reasonable mistake line 
of cases to include mistakes of law would allow the government 
to use any vagueness in a statute against a defendant,161 and it 
would also violate the trope that individuals are presumed to 
know the law.162  In short, under the prevailing federal court 
analysis, where the facts viewed objectively did not violate any 
law, an arrest or stop was deemed unconstitutional and the 
evidence was suppressed.163  As the Seventh Circuit succinctly  
stated, “[a] stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been 
broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively 
reasonable.”164 
In Heien, the Supreme Court soundly rejected this approach 
and ruled 8–1 that just as a search or seizure is consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment’s commands when the police are acting 
under a reasonable mistake of fact, the Fourth Amendment is not 
violated when the police are acting under a reasonable mistake 
about the scope of the substantive law.165  In Heien, a police 
officer stopped a car because he believed that North Carolina law 
required two working brake lights, and once he stopped the car, 
he received consent to search the car and discovered a bag of 
cocaine.166  The intermediate state court held that the initial stop 
was unlawful because the law only required one brake light to be 
working, and, therefore, the stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment.167  The State appealed the lower court’s ruling to its 
supreme court on the grounds that the police officer’s mistake of 
 
161 Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1278–79. 
162 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242 (“If [a]s a rule . . . a defendant is presumed to 
know the law, we must expect as much from law enforcement.”) (citing Orduna-
Martinez, 561 F.3d at 1137 n.2). 
163 It should be noted that several states beyond North Carolina aligned 
themselves with the Eighth Circuit and concluded that mistakes of law could be 
reasonable. State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 799 (S.D. 2010); Andrews v. State, 658 
S.E.2d 126, 128–29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss. 
2008); City of Wilmington v. Conner, 761 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). For 
a discussion of the approach of the Eighth Circuit and the state courts, see Wayne A. 
Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 79–82 (2011). 
164 United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006). As Professor 
Logan pointed out, this approach was consistent with the historical approach courts 
took when police officers made mistakes of law. At common law, if the police officer 
had no authority under the law for his actions, then the officer was a wrongdoer and 
subject to tort liability. Logan, supra note 163, at 78. 
165 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). 
166 Id. 
167 State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829–31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
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law was reasonable, and therefore, the stop complied with the 
demands of the Fourth Amendment.168  The state court agreed, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed.169 
Contrary to the majority of the federal circuits, the Court 
found no reason to distinguish between mistakes of fact and 
mistakes of substantive law.  Rather, because the standard under 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and because 
reasonable individuals can make reasonable mistakes of law as 
well as mistakes of fact, the Court found no reason to make a 
distinction between the two types of mistakes.170  In fact, the 
Court rejected the Defendant-Petitioner’s argument that the 
question of whether a mistake of law should result in a 
suppression of the evidence is more appropriately considered in 
determining whether there is a remedy for the constitutional 
violation, not whether there is a constitutional violation.171  
Instead, the Court concluded that where the mistake of 
substantive law made by the officer is a reasonable one, there 
simply is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.172  At the same 
time, the majority and the concurring opinion made clear that a 
mistaken judgment as to the reach of the Fourth Amendment 
itself—as opposed to substantive law—would not be consistent 
with the Constitution.173 
In expanding the realm of mistakes permitted within the 
Fourth Amendment to include mistakes of substantive law, the 
Court expressly rejected the claim that this approach would 
encourage the “sloppy study of the laws” on the grounds that the 
mistakes that were acceptable under the Fourth Amendment 
were limited to those that were “objectively reasonable.”174  
 
168 State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012). 
169 Heien came to the Court in a curious posture because North Carolina does 
not recognize the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Heien v. North 
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Thus, the case squarely 
presented the issue to the Supreme Court of whether a mistake of law renders a 
search or seizure unreasonable for purposes of a Fourth Amendment violation. 
170 Id. at 536 (“Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the 
law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are 
outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth 
Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when 
reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a 
similarly reasonable mistake of law.”). 
171 Id. at 538. 
172 Id. at 539–40. 
173 Id. at 539; id. at 541 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
174 Id. at 539–40 (majority opinion). 
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Moreover, both the majority and concurring opinions stressed 
that the Fourth Amendment’s tolerance of mistakes is not as 
great as it is in the context of the qualified immunity doctrine.175  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the 
question of whether the officer’s mistake of law was objectively 
reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment “is not as 
forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding 
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a 
constitutional or statutory violation.”176  And, Justice Kagan 
wrote separately to emphasize the distinction between mistakes 
of law consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard 
for liability under qualified immunity.  As she explained, “Our 
modern qualified immunity doctrine protects ‘all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,’ ”177 while 
an officer will be acting in accordance with the Fourth 
Amendment only when a “statute is genuinely ambiguous.”178  
Moreover, Justice Kagan cited as support for this understanding 
the government’s position in Heien, that situations in which 
there would be a reasonable mistake of law for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment would be “exceedingly rare.”179 
Heien thus allows police officers to act under a mistaken 
understanding of the law in their jurisdiction and yet not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.  At the same time, it is clear that the 
eight members of the Court who accepted this conclusion also 
believed that tolerance under the Fourth Amendment for 
mistakes of law is less forgiving towards mistaken judgments 
than is the standard for qualified immunity.180  Thus, after Heien, 
we know that what is considered an “objectively reasonable 
mistake” for purposes of the merits of a Fourth Amendment 
claim does not provide police officers with the leeway provided 
under the qualified immunity doctrine.  In short, there can be an 
unreasonable mistake of law that will invalidate a stop or search, 
but not necessarily result in liability for the officer in a § 1983 
 
175 Id. at 540–41 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
176 Id. at 539 (majority opinion). 
177 Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074, 2085 (2011)). 
178 Id. at 541 (“If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the 
officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a 
reasonable mistake. But if not, not.”). 
179 Id. at 541. 
180 Id. at 539 (majority opinion); id. at 540–42 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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action.  But, what is not clear after the decision is what 
constitutes an objectively reasonable mistake of law for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment and how that understanding should 
relate to any conclusion with respect to the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule.181  It is to those questions that this 
Article now turns. 
II. INTERPRETING THE HEIEN DECISION 
The Heien decision appears to be a very straightforward 
decision.  Chief Justice Roberts adopted the following logic in 
reaching the conclusion that reasonable suspicion can be based 
on the mistaken apprehension of the scope of the substantive 
law: (1) the standard for evaluating law enforcement’s conduct 
under the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness”; (2) “[t]o be 
reasonable is not to be perfect,” and thus searches based on 
mistakes of fact can be reasonable; (3) reasonable police officers 
can make reasonable mistakes of law as well as reasonable 
mistakes of fact; and (4) therefore, there is no reason to make a 
distinction between a mistake in fact and a mistake about the 
scope of a legal prohibition.182  Even assuming that this approach 
makes sense,183 the decision raises two significant questions.  
First, it is unclear what should count as a “reasonable mistake” 
for purposes of a substantive Fourth Amendment claim.  Second, 
in using the same “objectively reasonable” language that the 
courts also employ when discussing both the good faith exception 
and the qualified immunity standard, the decision blurs the 
reach of the Fourth Amendment with the reach of these two 
remedial doctrines.184 
 
181 Id. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that “the difference 
between qualified immunity’s reasonableness standard—which the Court insists 
without elaboration does not apply here—and the Court’s conception of 
reasonableness in this context—which remains undefined—will prove murky in 
application”). 
182 Id. at 536 (majority opinion). 
183 See Logan, supra note 163, at 90–109 (arguing persuasively against 
permitting errors of law to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment); LaFave, 
supra note 8, at 1847–48 (“[I]t is well-established Fourth Amendment doctrine that 
the sufficiency of the claimed probable cause must be determined by considering the 
conduct and circumstances deemed relevant within the context of the actual 
meaning of the applicable substantive provision, rather than the officer’s claimed 
interpretation of that statute.”). 
184 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me that the 
difference between qualified immunity’s reasonableness standard—which the Court 
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A. What Is an Objectively Reasonable Mistake of Law? 
In Heien, the majority gave only broad guidance as to how 
the lower courts should evaluate whether a mistake of law was 
“reasonable.”  Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice simply 
noted that the mistake must be “objectively reasonable,” that the 
courts should not consider the subjective understanding of the 
officer, and that the Fourth Amendment inquiry was not as 
forgiving as the qualified immunity inquiry.185  The concurrence 
written by Justice Kagan contains a bit more guidance, stating 
that a reasonable mistake of law is only one in which “the statute 
is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s 
judgment requires hard interpretive work.”186  Justice Kagan also 
wrote that she expected that such cases will be “exceedingly 
rare.”187  However, the lower court decisions rendered since Heien 
appear to support Justice Sotomayor’s concern that the decision 
did not provide sufficient guidance as to what was a reasonable 
mistake of law.188  Indeed, in the twelve months after Heien, the 
lower courts have issued conflicting opinions on what constitutes 
a reasonable mistake of law, with many decisions providing the 
police with a great deal of leeway in making mistakes in reading 
of state substantive law. 
The Heien Court had little problem concluding that the 
mistake of law made by the officer—stopping a car for only 
having one working brake light—was a reasonable one.  The 
appellate court in North Carolina had concluded that this stop 
was invalid because a North Carolina statute referring to a “stop 
lamp” meant that only one working brake light was required.189  
However, another provision of the statute required that vehicles 
have “all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good 
 
insists without elaboration does not apply here—and the Court’s conception of 
reasonableness in this context—which remains undefined—will prove murky in 
application.”). 
185 Id. at 539 (majority opinion). 
186 Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
187 Id. 
188 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I fear the Court’s 
unwillingness to sketch a fuller view of what makes a mistake of law reasonable 
only presages the likely difficulty that courts will have applying the Court’s decision 
in this case.”). 
189 State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829–31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). The North 
Carolina Supreme Court accepted this reading of the law. State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 
351, 354 (N.C. 2012). 
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working order.”190  In addition, there were no state court 
decisions interpreting the stop-lamp provision, and both the 
majority and dissent in the North Carolina Supreme Court 
decision acknowledged that it would have been reasonable to 
conclude that the law required vehicles to have two working 
brake lights.191  Thus, given the conflict in the wording of the  
statutory provisions and the lack of precedent, the United States 
Supreme Court quickly concluded it was “objectively reasonable” 
for the officer to believe two brake lights were required.192 
Some of the decisions that have been rendered since Heien 
appear to take the admonition that the mistake must be 
“objectively reasonable” as a real restriction on law enforcement.  
For example, in United States v. Alvarado-Zarza,193 the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the arresting officer committed an 
unreasonable mistake of law, and thus violated the Fourth 
Amendment in stopping a vehicle for failure to use a signal to 
change lanes when the Texas statute required signals only when 
making a left or right turn.194  The Fifth Circuit rested this 
conclusion both on the plain language of the statute and the case 
law that predated the stop, which drew a distinction between 
turns and lane changes.195  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found a 
stop unreasonable when the police officer claimed he believed 
that the use of a commercially sold license plate frame violated a 
state statute requiring license plates to be clearly legible.196  
Finally, two federal district courts have held that stops were not 
 




193 782 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2015). 
194 Id. at 251. 
195 Id. at 250. See generally People v. Jones, B255728, 2015 WL 1873269 (Cal. 
Ct. App. April 23, 2015) (stopping individual for walking in the middle of the road in 
a residential area not reasonable mistake when both statutory language and 
precedent make clear that statutory prohibition applied in commercial areas, not 
residential ones); State v. Brown, 870 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (finding that 
the police error of arresting someone who had an open container in a car in a private 
parking lot was not reasonable because both the statute and case law established 
the open container law applied only to cars on public streets or highways); State v. 
Scriven, No. A-5680-13T3, 2015 WL 773824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015) 
(stopping vehicle for having high beams on was an unreasonable mistake when plain 
language of statute required dimming of high beams only when facing oncoming 
traffic and officer who stopped driver was in a parked vehicle). 
196 United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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reasonable mistakes of law under Heien when the officers based 
the stops on the individuals having air fresheners hanging from 
their rearview mirrors and claimed that those air fresheners 
could be violations of ordinances preventing windshields being 
obstructed.197 
Yet, other decisions have provided officers with considerably 
more leeway to misunderstand the law and remain compliant 
with the commands of the Fourth Amendment.  Several courts 
have read Heien as instructing the courts to read any ambiguities 
in a statute as favoring the government.198  Indeed, one court 
stated that it was “skeptical” that the officer’s reading of the 
statute was correct, but nonetheless concluded that under Heien 
the officer’s mistake was reasonable, and, hence, there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation in stopping the vehicle.199  
 
197 United States v. Black, 104 F. Supp. 3d 997 (W.D. Mo. 2015); United States 
v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (D. Nev. 2015). A number of state courts have also 
required the State to bear the burden of showing that the mistake was objectively 
reasonable. See Darringer v. State, 46 N.E.3d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (when the 
legislature had changed statute a year earlier, the police officer’s lack of knowledge 
of the change was not objectively reasonable); State v. Nelson, 356 P.3d 1113 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2015) (concluding that the State failed to present evidence that the 
mistake of law was reasonable); State v. Lerdahl, No. 2014AP2119–CR, 2015 WL 
4619946, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2015) (relying on Justice Kagan’s language 
that “objectively reasonable mistakes of law are ‘exceedingly rare’ ” and concluded 
the mistake was unreasonable); Brown, 870 N.W.2d 687 (finding that the police 
error is arresting someone who had an open container in a car in a private parking 
lot was not reasonable because both the statute and case law established the open 
container law applied only to cars on public streets or highways); Jones, 2015 WL 
1873269 (stopping an individual for walking in the middle of the road in a 
residential area was not a reasonable mistake when both statutory language and 
precedent make clear that the statutory prohibition applied in commercial areas, not 
residential ones); State v. Tercero, 467 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (reading the 
statute to permit the warrantless withdrawal of blood was not reasonable). 
198 United States v. Flaven, No. 3:13–cr–00104–RCJ–VPC, 2015 WL 2219779, at 
*2 (D. Nev. May 12, 2015) (“Although the ambiguity in the statute might favor 
Defendant in the context of a citation for an illegal lane change due to the rule of 
lenity, the ambiguity favors the Government in the context of a Fourth Amendment 
challenge.”); United States v. Stanbridge, 3:14–cr–30020, 2015 WL 682779, at *4 
(C.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2015) (concluding that the ambiguity in the reading of the statute 
“must be resolved in the Government’s favor”); Williams v. State, 28 N.E.3d 293, 295 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding mistake of law a reasonable one when “[a] reasonable 
person unversed in statutory interpretation” would likely read statute as officer did); 
State v. Wilson, No. 111263, 2015 WL 326662, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2015) 
(finding mistake of law reasonable even though as dissent points out, the statute 
permitted the defendant’s conduct). 
199 United States v Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1295 (D. Kan. 2015); see also 
United States v. Henry, CRIMINAL NO. 15-26-JWD-SCR, 2015 WL 6479029, at *3 
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Moreover, even where courts have concluded that the plain 
language of the statute required the conclusion that the 
defendant did not violate the law, they have been willing to 
conclude that the mistake was nonetheless an “objectively 
reasonable” mistake.200 
Perhaps most disconcerting are decisions finding no Fourth 
Amendment violation when officers justify the stop by pointing to 
alleged violations of traffic laws when the defendant is using 
items in the manner that the general public does.  For example, 
contrary to the conclusions of two federal district courts,201 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated when an officer stopped a vehicle 
because it had an air freshener hanging from its rearview 
mirror.202  The Wisconsin court, citing the “tremendous number” 
of statutory provisions governing roadway safety, concluded that 
the officer’s understanding that a hanging air freshener could 
violate the State’s unobstructed windshield requirement was an 
“objectively reasonable mistake of law.”203  And, it reached this 
conclusion even though it recognized that under the construction 
of the statute that the State was proffering, the statute would 
also ban oil change stickers, rosaries, and even rearview 
mirrors.204  Other state courts have also found that stops based 
on air fresheners and parking tags hanging from rear-view 
mirrors were reasonable mistakes under Heien because an officer 
could believe these hanging items violated the unobstructed 
windshield requirement.205  Indeed, in one case from New York, 
 
(M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2015) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police 
impression was not false and unreasonable). 
200 People v. Campuzano, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 591–92 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. 2015) (concluding both that the ordinance is “clear and unambiguous” and that 
the mistake of law was “objectively reasonable”); State v. Hurley, 117 A.3d 433, 441 
(Vt. 2015) (even though plain language supports the conclusion that there was no 
violation, mistake by officer is reasonable); Williams, 28 N.E.3d at 295 (concluding 
that although the language of the statute supported the defendant, the officer’s 
mistake was reasonable because a “reasonable person unversed in statutory 
interpretation would very likely read” the section as the officer did). 
201 Black, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 1004–05; Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1286. 
202 State v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 160 (Wis. 2015). 
203 Id. at 155. 
204 Id. at 156. 
205 See Mason v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 726 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (finding 
stop based on parking tag objectively reasonable); see also Hurley, 117 A.3d 433 
(finding stop based on air freshener was reasonable mistake of law); People v. 
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the court found the stop to be a reasonable mistake under Heien 
even though, as the dissent pointed out, the police permitted the 
defendant’s girlfriend to drive away from the police precinct with 
the object dangling from the rearview mirror.206 
Some courts have applied a similarly forgiving approach 
with respect to stops based on statutes requiring license plates to 
be visible.207  For example, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded 
that a traffic stop based on a concern that a trailer hitch violated 
a statute involving the visibility of a license plate because the 
officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable.208  As in the 
Wisconsin case, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that 
adopting the officer’s view of the law would make “a substantial 
amount of otherwise lawful conduct illegal,” including not only 
the use of trailer hitches, but also wheelchair and scooter carriers 
relied upon by those who are physically disabled.209  Nonetheless, 
because there was no prior case law addressing the use of trailer 
hitches, the Illinois court concluded that the officer’s actions were 
based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law.210 
Many decisions issued after Heien thus show an increased 
tolerance of police stops of individuals based on asserted 
mistaken views of the law.  What was presented to the Supreme 
Court as an allowance for misunderstandings in those 
“exceedingly rare” cases where there is a “ ‘counterintuitive and 
confusing’ law,”211 has become in the view of many courts an 
 
Bookman, 131 A.D.3d 1258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (same); Freeman v. 
Commonwealth, 778 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (same). 
206 Bookman, 131 A.D.3d at 1262 (Austin, J., dissenting). 
207 See United States v. Henry, CRIMINAL NO. 15-26-JWD-SCR, 2015 WL 
6479029, at *3 (M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2015); McCabe v. Gonzales, No. 1:13-cv-00435-
CWD, 2015 WL 5679735, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2015); United States v. 
McCullough, Criminal No. 3:15cr115–MHT (WO), 2015 WL 5013910, at *5 (M.D. 
Ala. Aug. 17, 2015); People v. Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 653–54 (Ill. 2015); see also 
State v. Crudo, No. 112,805, 2015 WL 7162274, at *13 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2015) 
(rejecting the defendant’s claim that the license plate light was installed by the 
manufacturer and therefore could not reasonably be a statutory violation). The 
Kansas court went so far as to call the fact that the equipment was installed by the 
vehicle manufacturer “irrelevant” and reversed the trial court’s suppression order 
with instructions that a new judge be appointed to hear the defendant’s motion on 
remand. Id. 
208 Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d at 651. 
209 Id. at 650. 
210 Id. at 652–53. 
211 Brief for Respondent, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-
604), 2014 WL 3660500, at *17; Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Heien v. North 
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604) (agreeing that to constitute an excuse 
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excuse that allows for any alleged ambiguity to be read in favor 
of the police officer’s actions.  This approach reflects a 
misunderstanding of what Heien meant in concluding that a 
reasonable mistake of law could form the basis of a permissible 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, the lenient 
approach ignores the distinction that the Court drew in Heien 
between the margin of error it was permitting police officers 
under the Fourth Amendment and the margin of error permitted 
in qualified immunity cases.212  The qualified immunity standard 
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable 
but mistaken judgments” by requiring the plaintiff to show that 
the asserted right was “sufficiently definite that any reasonable 
official . . . would have understood that he was violating it.”213  By 
permitting the State to justify a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment by raising any statutory construction argument in 
favor of the officer’s alleged view of the law, even when 
“skeptical” of the government’s argument, these courts are 
essentially applying the same lenient standard given to officials 
in qualified immunity cases to the substantive Fourth 
Amendment question. 
But, more problematic, giving such leniency for any asserted 
understanding of the law is contrary to the substantive 
commands of the Fourth Amendment.  As the Court reminded us 
in June 2015, warrantless searches “are per se 
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.”214  Thus, it is the government’s 
burden to justify any warrantless action.  Yet, the Court has also 
given the police great latitude in stopping individuals and 
 
based on a reasonable mistake of law, it must be “exceedingly rare,” “objective,” and 
“a reasonable lawyer would think that the policeman was right on the law, and only 
if after . . . a careful scrutiny and serious difficulty in construing the law, does it turn 
out that he is wrong”). 
212 Admittedly, the distinction between the two doctrines that the Court relied 
on is less than clear, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent. Heien, 135 S. 
Ct. at 547 (noting that “the difference between qualified immunity’s reasonableness 
standard—which the Court insists without elaboration does not apply here—and the 
Court’s conception of reasonableness in this context—which remains undefined—will 
prove murky in application.”). But, taking the Court at its word, it clearly intended a 
more stringent test for mistakes of law and substantive Fourth Amendment claims 
as required in the qualified immunity context. 
213 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) 
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). 
214 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). 
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vehicles without warrants.215  Given the significant degree of 
latitude these rulings provide to law enforcement,216 the 
suggestion of some courts that any asserted ambiguity in the law 
be read to provide a constitutional basis for a seizure should be 
rejected as shifting the traditional burden in Fourth Amendment 
cases from the government to the defendant. 
Bear in mind that a police officer’s subjective 
misunderstanding of the law will not affect the constitutionality 
of a seizure as long as a review of the facts available to the officer 
establishes a basis for a finding of some violation of the law.217  
Moreover, as long as there is an objectively reasonable belief that 
some offense was committed, it does not matter that the officer 
was using the alleged offense as a pretext for pursuing a 
hunch,218 that the officer arrested and jailed an individual for a 
minor offense that is only punishable by fine,219 or that state law 
prohibited an arrest for the crime,220 as long as the officers had 
probable cause to believe the offense was committed.  Thus, in 
the cases involving air fresheners, trailer hitches, and the like, 
 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 45–54; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This Court has allowed an officer 
to stop you for whatever reason he wants—so long as he can point to a pretextual 
justification after the fact.”). 
216 Granting this much latitude to police officers in making routine traffic stops 
has certainly been criticized. As Professor LaFave lamented in his article on traffic 
stops, the Court’s approach allows “prohibited drug stops to be sanitized by calling 
them traffic stops.” LaFave, supra note 8, at 1904. Moreover, in the words of 
Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg, the approach teaches law enforcement that “it can 
escape the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions if it offers phony explanations for 
actions.” Stephen Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial 
Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 134 (2003). 
217 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004); see Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 
2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The officer does not even need to know which law 
you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible infraction—even 
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.”). 
218 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
219 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001). In fact, in the case, 
the Court even recognized that the “physical incidents of arrest were merely 
gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising 
extremely poor judgment.” Id. at 346–47. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the 
larger societal interest in workable Fourth Amendment rules precluded a finding of 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment when the police had probable cause for the 
arrest. Id. at 347–53. 
220 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“We conclude that warrantless 
arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable 
under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests 
however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.”). 
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the only possible basis for the stop was the officer’s asserted 
mistake about the substantive law’s requirements.  And, where 
the basis for the stop is the use of an item in the manner 
intended, the most reasonable conclusion is that the officer is 
asserting an understanding of the law that is not reasonable and 
that is likely a pretext for an investigation of suspected criminal 
activity.221  While the Court may have excluded the possibility of 
a pretext claim when there is a violation of substantive law in 
Whren,222 and Heien now permits police to seize individuals when 
the substantive law does not prescribe the activity,223 Heien 
should not be read to tolerate ignorance, or worse, on the part of 
police officers in complying with the commands of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In short, Heien should not be a license for police to avoid 
their basic responsibility to ascertain what the law actually is 
before seizing persons.  Every day we subject ourselves to the 
possibility of a traffic stop when we get into our cars.224  Indeed, 
the sheer volume of traffic laws—and the de minimis nature of 
most of the violations and consequences of violations—ensures 
that many, if not all of us, may violate traffic laws on a regular 
basis.225  As the Seventh Circuit recently stated, “A suspicion so 
broad that would permit the police to stop a substantial portion 
of the lawfully driving public . . . is not reasonable.”226 
 
221 See United States v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (D. Nev. 2015); United 
States v. Black, 104 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 2015). 
222 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815–16. 
223 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014). 
224 As the dissent in Mason v. Commonwealth stated, “Every day, millions are 
stopped for one of the myriad of regulations governing our use of public streets. As 
soon as you get into your car, even before you turn the ignition key, you have 
subjected yourself to intense police scrutiny.” 767 S.E.2d 726, 735 (Va. Ct. App. 
2015) (Humphreys, J., dissenting). 
225 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1514 
(2007); LaFave, supra note 8, at 1853. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent in 
Heien, these stops “can be ‘annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating.’ ” Heien, 
135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 
(1968)); see Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or 
jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the officer is looking 
for more. . . . As onlookers pass by, the officer may ‘feel with sensitive fingers every 
portion of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms and armpits, 
waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the 
legs down to the feet.’ ” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, n.13)). 
226 United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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Professor Forde-Mazrui has argued that unfettered police 
discretion is inconsistent with our acceptance of the rule of law 
and our rejection of a police state in which law enforcement has 
the authority to peremptorily search and seize individuals 
without cause.227  Our commitment to the rule of law not only 
limits the exercise of police powers to conduct the legislature has 
defined as criminal in nature, but also provides the public with 
fair warning of the type of conduct that can result in interactions 
with the police.228  Moreover, numerous studies have shown that 
members of minority groups are disproportionately more likely to 
be stopped by police officers than are white drivers.229  If Heien is 
 
227 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 225, at 1500. 
228 Id. at 1506–07. Moreover, individuals are more likely to attempt to obey the 
law and accept the consequences of failure to obey the law when they perceive the 
police as exercising their authority fairly and legitimately. See Stephen J. Schulhofer 
et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural 
Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 344–45 (2011) (explaining 
that empirical research demonstrates that when individuals perceive authorities as 
acting fairly, they will accept that the actions were legitimate and therefore tailor 
their conduct to comply with the law). 
229 See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate  
Risks of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html; Kevin R. Johnson, 
How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious 
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1047 (2010); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 225, at 1511–
15; R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2003) (citing studies of the incidence of racial profiling by law 
enforcement); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. 
REV. 43, 60–61 (2009) (providing examples of black individuals being stopped 
repeatedly when in predominantly white neighborhoods). As Professor Capers 
pointed out, although the Terry decision permitted police to proactively prevent 
crime, in most cases, the police’s suspicions are disproven. Id. at 62–63. Moreover, 
Terry stops—at least in New York City, which keeps statistics on these stops—
disproportionately affect those who are black or Hispanic. Id. at 63. In fact, in 
January 2014, New York City settled a class action lawsuit filed in January 2008 
challenging the stop and frisk policies and practices of the police department on the 
grounds that the police were engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling in carrying 
out the policies. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City 
Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html. In 2012, 
a federal district court ruled that the tactics of the New York Police Department 
were unconstitutional. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). The injunction the court ordered, however, was stayed by the Second Circuit, 
and the appellate court ordered that the case be assigned to a different district court 
judge for further proceedings. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 
2013). This decision in turn was partially vacated at the request of the City to allow 
remand to explore a settlement. Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362, 365 (2d 
Cir. 2014). 
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read as permitting police conduct based on purported ambiguities 
in the statute without an examination of the reasonableness of 
that asserted ambiguity, the decision threatens to exacerbate 
this problem.230  Thus, limiting Heien to the “exceedingly rare 
case” where a statute is “genuinely ambiguous” is not only 
necessary to prevent the “sloppy study of law,” it is necessary to 
discourage the abuse of law enforcement powers.231  At a 
minimum, courts should respect the general rule that the 
government bears the burden of justifying any warrantless 
search by proving that the statute is genuinely ambiguous.  In 
short, the government should be required to show that, in the 
words of the government advocate during the Heien oral 
 
230 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Heien dissent, the Supreme Court’s 
approach threatens to “significantly expand” the authority that the police already 
have in stopping individuals. Heien v. North Carolina 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
231 Of course, as Professor Harmon points out, there are limits to the regulation 
of police behavior through constitutional litigation. First, the exclusionary rule sets 
a floor on police behavior; that is, it says what police may not do, rather than what 
police should do. Harmon, supra note 60, at 776–78. Thus, even constitutionally 
permissible activity, such as a lawful stop, may result in substantial and perhaps 
undesirable harm to an individual. Id. at 778. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the 
Court acknowledged as much. 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001). In that case, the police 
officer arrested a mother in front of her children for failure to wear a seatbelt, and 
the Court acknowledged that “the physical incidents of arrest were merely 
gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising 
extremely poor judgment.” Id. at 346–47. Nonetheless, the Court rejected her claim 
that the arrest was unreasonable because of the larger societal interests in having 
“readily administrable rules.” Id. at 347. Second, the Court renders its decisions, as 
Professor Harmon also points out, with at best limited empirical data on the actual 
effects of the rulings on police behavior. Harmon, supra note 60, at 772–76. 
Consequently, the Court makes normative judgments without an understanding of 
the context of the issues or the consequences of the decisions. Id. Indeed, one can see 
this in the Atwater Court’s rejection of the claim that a decision in favor of law 
enforcement in that case could result in increased police activity—and potential 
abuse—because such a claim was as simply “speculative.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 
n.25 (“Noticeably absent from the parade of horribles is any indication that the 
‘potential for abuse’ has ever ripened into a reality.”). However, as Professor LaFave 
pointed out, once the police began using the traffic code as part of the war on drugs, 
police began making stops for insignificant traffic violations that were routinely 
upheld by the Court. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1847. Thus, it is difficult to have a 
great deal of confidence in the Atwater Court’s assertion that “just as surely the 
country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense 
arrests.” 532 U.S. at 353. Thus, while Professor Harmon is correct in pointing out 
the limits of constitutional remedies in controlling police behavior, that is a reason 
to explore other means of addressing the appropriate regulation of police activity—
as she suggests in her article—and not a reason to remove the floor of the 
Constitution. 
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argument, “a reasonable lawyer would think that the policeman  
was right on the law.”232  And, where that is not true, the officer’s 
conduct should be found to be unreasonable and in violation of 
the commands of the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Unreasonable Mistakes of Law and the Good Faith Exception 
Not only does the Heien decision fail to give the lower courts 
significant guidance on what is a “reasonable mistake of law” for 
purposes of evaluating the substance of a Fourth Amendment 
claim, but the distinction the majority opinion and the 
concurrence drew between “reasonable mistakes of law” for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and mistakes tolerated by 
the qualified immunity doctrines leads one to question what the 
relationship is between reasonable mistakes of law and the good 
faith exception.  As noted above, eight members of the Court 
accepted the proposition that a mistake could be unreasonable 
for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim without being 
unreasonable for purposes of a qualified immunity defense.233  
And as was discussed earlier,234 there is an overlap with respect 
to qualified immunity and the good faith exception.  Yet, the 
Heien decision is silent on the question of whether the good faith 
exception should be available to the government if there is an 
unreasonable mistake of law for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The failure of the Court to address the relationship between 
its decision and the good faith exception is particularly confusing 
in light of the arguments put forth in the case.  The Petitioner 
argued, as did Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, that mistakes of law 
should be considered within the context of the good faith 
exception rather than in the context of whether there is a 
 
232 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 350 
(2014) (No. 13-604). Of course, it is possible that this approach could also encourage 
the legislature to deliberately write more ambiguous laws so as to allow the police 
and prosecutors to argue that the mistake was a reasonable one or that at a 
minimum, it was not so unreasonable as to require suppression. Professor Logan 
made a similar argument in his article, suggesting that allowing mistakes of law to 
satisfy the reasonable suspicion or probable cause standards would encourage 
textual imprecision. Logan, supra note 163, at 101. However, this is a consequence 
the Court has apparently accepted with its Heien decision. Moreover, the legislature 
remains incentivized—at least in theory—to write its laws with some precision to 
avoid vagueness challenges. 
233 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539; id. at 540–42 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
234 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment.235  The majority opinion 
responded to this argument in two ways.  First, it excluded 
mistakes regarding the reach of the Fourth Amendment from the 
types of mistakes that can be consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.236  Second, the Court explained that in prior cases 
dealing with mistakes of law, the Court had looked to the good 
faith exception because in those cases the Court had either found 
or assumed a Fourth Amendment violation.237  In contrast, the 
Court explained that in Heien it was confronting the “antecedent 
question” of whether there was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.238  And yet, despite the heavy presence of the good 
faith exception in the arguments before the Court, two 
paragraphs later, the Court drew a distinction between 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and the inquiry 
under the qualified immunity standard with no mention of where 
the good faith exception would fit into the new understanding of 
the role of mistakes of law.239 
Although Heien has been interpreted by many courts to 
expand the tolerance for police error under the Fourth 
Amendment, the failure of the Supreme Court to address the 
relationship between a Fourth Amendment claim and the good 
faith relationship may paradoxically provide an opportunity to 
reconsider the reach of the good faith exception.  In every case 
between December 2014 and December 2015 in which the courts 
have concluded that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment 
because the mistake of law was an unreasonable one, the courts 
have suppressed the evidence without considering the good faith 
exception.240  In fact, of the almost 150 cases that cite Heien 
 
235 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 23–34, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 350 (No. 13-604); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–25, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 350 (No. 13-604); Heien, 135 
S. Ct. at 545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
236 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (majority opinion). The concurrence made this same 
point. Id. at 541 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
237 Id. at 539 (majority opinion). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 539–40. 
240 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Black, 104 F. Supp. 
3d 997 (W.D. Mo. 2015); United States v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (D. Nev. 
2015); Darringer v. State, 46 N.E.3d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); State v. Nelson, 356 
P.3d 1113 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015); State v. Brown, No. 13-2054, 2015 WL 4468841 
(Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2015); People v. Jones, B255728, 2015 WL 1873269 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2015). 
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during this time period, only three state courts have 
acknowledged a good faith exception argument by the 
government.241  In addition, a review of the briefs filed in federal 
court shows that the government has not even argued the good 
faith exception in these cases.  Instead, the government focuses 
on whether the police officer’s stop of the individual was 
authorized by the substantive state law, and if not, whether the 
police officer’s asserted understanding of the law was “objectively 
reasonable” for purposes of the substantive Fourth Amendment 
claim.242 
The failure of the government to argue the good faith 
exception in these cases is a bit surprising given the fact that 
before Heien, the government did raise the good faith exception 
to excuse mistaken readings of statutory proscriptions.243  The 
simple answer appears to be that once the determination is made 
that the officer’s mistake of law was unreasonable, then the good 
faith exception is not—and should not be—available to the 
government.  That is, a failure on the part of a law enforcement 
agent to understand the scope of a legal prohibition is the type of 
culpable conduct that justifies the invocation of the exclusionary 
rule.  Such an approach respects basic principles of separation of 
powers by ensuring that the legislative and executive branches 




241 In State v. Tercero, the court concluded that the police officer’s reading of a 
statute was unreasonable, and it rejected the government’s attempt to use the good 
faith exception because Texas has a more restrictive good faith exception than the 
federal good faith exception. 467 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ct. App. Tex. 2015). In State v. Miller, 
the court did not reach the good faith argument because it concluded the mistake 
was a reasonable one under the Fourth Amendment. No. 9-14-50, 2015 WL 5095890, 
at *2 (Ct. App. Ohio Aug. 31, 2015). Finally, in the one case to reach the merits of 
the good faith exception argument, State v. Heilman, the Oregon appellate court 
concluded that the trial court erred in finding the exception available when there is 
an unreasonable mistake of law made by the officer. 342 P.3d 1102, 1106 n.5 (Ct. 
App. Ore. 2015). 
242 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539. 
243 See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d, 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999). What makes the failure of 
the government to raise the good faith exception even more peculiar is that these 
cases predated the Roberts Court’s expansive reading of the exclusionary rule in the 
Hudson, Herring, and Davis decisions. 
244 Logan, supra note 163, at 95–101. 
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consistent with the results in most of the good faith exception 
cases, if not the expansive language used by the Court in its most 
recent opinions on the good faith exception. 
As Professor Logan has pointed out, permitting police 
officers the leeway to make mistakes about the scope of statutory 
proscriptions raises significant separation of powers issues.245  
Under separation of powers doctrine, the legislature is assigned 
the principal duty of establishing the boundaries of criminal 
conduct with the judiciary interpreting the law as appropriate.246  
When a police officer relies on an unreasonable reading of these 
standards, the courts should not excuse these actions under the 
good faith exception simply because the prosecutor is able to 
construct some sort of statutory construction argument that is 
debatable.  Such a result would invite law enfocement to evade 
the limits placed on police conduct by the legislature. Where a 
statute is genuinely ambiguous, Heien teaches that there is no 
Fourth Amendment violation because the police conduct was 
reasonable and, therefore, the police action could be deemed 
consistent with the will of the legislature.247  But, once the 
conclusion is reached that the stop was not based on a reasonable 
understanding of the law, and therefore the officer ignored the 
limits placed by the legislature on her conduct, the evidence 
should be suppressed. 
Requiring suppression once a determination is made that the 
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable also promotes the 
clarification of the reach of the law.248  With the division between 
Fourth Amendment claims and a remedy in terms of either the 
exclusion of evidence or liability under § 1983, courts may reject 
the request for relief on remedial grounds without reaching the 
Fourth Amendment question.  This approach can result in a 
failure to develop the substantive Fourth Amendment law 
 
245 Id. at 95. 
246 Id. Assigning this role to the legislature is consistent with the void for 
vagueness doctrine. A statute violates due process when it is “so vague that it fails to 
give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it 
invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 
(2015); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2010); United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 
247 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539–40 (2014). As Professor Logan 
persuasively argues, permitting police to point to ambiguities in the law may have 
the unintended consequence of excusing sloppy drafting by the legislative branch. 
Logan, supra note 163, at 95–97. 
248 Id. at 98. 
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because the courts can decline to address how the statute should 
be read by instead ruling that the reading was a “reasonable” 
one.249  By equating the “objective reasonableness” standard for 
both the Fourth Amendment claim and for the good faith 
exception when the issue is the interpretation of a statute, the 
courts will be required to issue a clarification on the meaning of 
the statute, and thereby provide law enforcement with adequate 
guidance in the future, rather than leaving the scope of the 
statutory proscription unanswered.250 
Equating the two standards is also consistent with the 
Court’s focus on deterrence as the “sole purpose” of the 
exclusionary rule.251  The Court’s approach of assuming that the 
exclusionary rule works solely to deter individual officers from 
violating the commands of the Fourth Amendment has been 
amply criticized.252  But, accepting the deterrence rationale at 
face value, there should be no good faith exception when a police 
officer’s action is not based on an objectively reasonable 
understanding of the scope of statutory proscriptions.  Indeed, a 
corollary to the deterrence rationale is that where evidence is 
suppressed, the police officers involved will alter their conduct to 
ensure that evidence seized in the future will not be similarly 
suppressed.  Thus, under the assumption that “sloppy” studies of 
the law are to be discouraged,253 the evidence should be 
suppressed when the police officer acts pursuant to an 
unreasonable understanding of the law. 
Moreover, while the Court’s focus on deterrence at the 
individual level is difficult to justify, there is support for the 
notion that the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states 
helped to play a role in the increased professionalism of the 
 
249 See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This result is bad 
for citizens, who need to know their rights and responsibilities, and it is bad for 
police, who would benefit from clearer direction.”). 
250 Moreover, as Professor Kerr has persuasively written, the existence of a 
remedy in terms of exclusion of evidence encourages defendants to raise challenges 
to law enforcement actions. Orin S. Kerr, supra note 153, at 1088. 
251 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011); see also Herring v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141–42 (2009). 
252 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as a 
Constitutional Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L., 357, 357 (2013); David Gray, A 
Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2013); Kinports, 
Culpability, supra note 130, at 835–43. 
253 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539–40 (majority opinion). 
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police by creating institutional incentives for better training for 
police officers.254  Requiring evidence to be suppressed when the 
police do not have an objectively reasonable understanding of the 
law should encourage police departments to provide adequate 
training and updates to police officers on the reach of the 
substantive law.255  And because adequate training on the reach 
of the law helps to guard against police overreaching—and 
potentially arbitrary police actions—the use of the exclusionary 
rule in this context, in the words of Herring and Davis, “pay[s] its 
way.”256 
The determination that the good faith exception is not 
available when there is an unreasonable mistake of law also 
appears to be consistent, or at least reconcilable, with the general 
approach to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  
Despite the broad language the Court used in both Herring and 
Davis regarding the limits to the exclusionary rule,257 the good 
faith exception remains, at least in name, an exception to the 
general rule that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment should be suppressed.258  Further, in each case, but 
for Hudson, the Court deemed mistaken judgment of the police 
officers “objectively reasonable.”259  For example, in Leon, the 
officers applied for a warrant as required by the Fourth 
Amendment, and they had no indication that the warrant was 
invalid.260  Similarly, in Krull, there was no indication that the 
 
254 Gray, supra note 252, at 27 (noting “[t]he real target for deterrence is not the 
individual officer, but law enforcement agencies of which they are a part” and that 
“the exclusionary rule creates strong incentives for those agencies to train police 
officers”); Kinports, Culpability, supra note 130, at 833 (same); Logan, supra note 
163, at 103–05 (discussing the importance of training of police officers). 
255 See Darringer v. State, 46 N.E.3d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding the police 
officer’s mistake of law unreasonable where legislature had amended the law a year 
before the stop and police officer’s understanding did not include the change made 
by the legislature). 
256 Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48; Davis, 564 U.S. at 238. 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 130–42. 
258 It should be noted that, taking the Strieff decision together with the good 
faith exception decisions, there is a reasonable argument that the exclusion of 
evidence, rather than the suppression of evidence, is in fact the exception. Whether 
Strieff portends a more significant expansion of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, 
however, is the subject of another article. 
259 Kinports, Culpability, supra note 130, at 825–26. 
260 Unites States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916–17 (1984). As Professors Kamin and 
Marceau, among others, have noted, Leon’s recognition of the good faith exception 
when the police obtain a warrant can be understood as consistent with the Fourth 
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statute the officers were relying on was invalid.261  In both Evans 
and Herring, there was also no reason for the police officers who 
were stopping the individuals to know that the basis for the stop 
was factually erroneous.  Admittedly, in Evans, the mistaken 
information was transmitted to a police officer from a judicial 
officer,262 whereas in Herring, the erroneous information came 
from someone in another police department.263  Yet, in both cases, 
the Court viewed the police officers as following the correct 
procedures under the Fourth Amendment, and, hence, the Court 
was unwilling to exclude the evidence.264  And, finally, in Davis, 
the officers’ actions were consistent with binding precedent in the 
jurisdiction.265 
Hudson is the only case in which it could be concluded that 
the police who conducted the stop or search had reason to know 
their conduct was not in accordance with governing law under 
the Fourth Amendment.  In Hudson, it was clearly established 
that police were required to knock and announce before executing 
a search warrant and the police officers failed to adhere to this 
rule.266  The Court, however, broke the chain between the 
illegality of the police conduct and the evidence seized by the 
police by determining that the violation “was not a but-for cause 
of obtaining the evidence.”267  And, while Hudson’s comments 
about the good faith exception were picked up by the Court in 
Herring and in Davis, the degree of police culpability in fact was 
irrelevant to Hudson’s holding.  Hudson created a bright-line 
rule that evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce 
requirement was never to be suppressed, regardless of the 
culpability of the officers.268 
 
Amendment’s general preference for warrants. Kamin and Marceau, supra note 14, 
at 614. 
261 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987). 
262 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
263 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138 (2009). 
264 Evans, 514 U.S. at 15–16 (“There is no indication that the arresting officer 
was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer 
record.”); Herring, 555 U.S. at 140 (explaining “[t]he Coffee County officers did 
nothing improper”). 
265 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011) (explaining that “when 
binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-
trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and 
public-safety responsibilities”). 
266 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006). 
267 Id. at 592. 
268 Kinports, Culpability, supra note 130, at 829. 
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In short, once there is an unreasonable understanding of the 
substantive law, the good faith exception should not permit the 
government to introduce the evidence discovered through the 
unlawful conduct.  That is, an objectively unreasonable 
understanding of the substantive law renders the officer culpable 
for purposes of the good faith exception.  Thus, the fact that the 
lower courts who have determined that the mistake of law was 
unreasonable post-Heien were correct in not exploring the good 
faith exception.  But, if this understanding of the relationship 
between the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the 
good faith exception is correct, the understanding casts some 
doubt on the relationship between the good faith exception and 
the doctrine of qualified immunity.  Recall that eight members of 
the Court drew a distinction between mistakes that are 
“objectively reasonable” for purposes of a Fourth Amendment 
claim and “objectively reasonable” mistakes for purposes of an 
officer’s qualified immunity claim.  If the first premise of this 
paragraph is correct—that a mistake of law that is not 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is also not 
objectively reasonable for purposes of the good faith exception—
and if we accept Heien’s conclusion that a mistake of law can be 
unreasonable for a Fourth Amendment claim but reasonable for 
purposes of a qualified immunity claim, then the question arises 
as to whether there is a distinction between what is an 
“objectively reasonable” mistake for purposes of the good faith 
exception and what is “objectively reasonable” for purposes of 
qualified immunity.  And, that question in turn may suggest 
rethinking the reach of the good faith exception. 
III. A RETHINKING OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 
It may be possible that Heien could provide a vehicle to 
reconsider the expansive language of the most recent good faith 
exception cases and limit the reach of the exception when a police 
officer misapprehends the reach of the Fourth Amendment.269  
 
269 The attempt in this Article to limit the reach of the good faith exception may 
have been made more difficult by a decision released after this Article was written, 
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), in which the Court arguably increased its 
tolerance for constitutional violations by incorporating some of the culpability 
concerns of the good faith exception into the attenuation doctrine. In Strieff, the 
Court concluded that the attenuation doctrine can apply when the officer 
unconstitutionally stopped an individual and in the stop discovered that the suspect 
had an outstanding warrant which in turn led to an arrest and search that produced 
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Both the majority and concurring Heien opinions distinguished 
mistakes as to the scope of the statutory proscription from 
mistakes as to the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself.270  This 
distinction means that a police officer can misapprehend the 
scope of a traffic regulation and have the stop conform to the 
Fourth Amendment, but if the officer misapprehends the 
commands of the Fourth Amendment itself, then there is a 
violation of the Constitution.  In addition, the majority and 
concurring opinions distinguish between mistakes for purposes of 
a Fourth Amendment claim and mistakes that are unreasonable 
for purposes of qualified immunity.271  These two distinctions 
leave one to wonder where the good faith exception fits into the 
continuum between a substantive Fourth Amendment claim and 
a qualified immunity claim. 
There seem to be three choices.  The first choice is to read 
the good faith standard as the same standard used in the 
qualified immunity context.  But, as was discussed in the 
preceding section, this conclusion is contrary to the approach the 
lower courts have taken and would encourage the “sloppy study 
of law” that the Heien Court seemed to be concerned about.  The 
other alternatives are to reconceive the good faith exception as 
part of the substance of the Fourth Amendment or to limit the 
applicability of the good faith exception.  It is to those latter two 
alternatives to which this Article now turns. 
Applying the logic of Heien, it is difficult to understand the 
distinction being drawn by the Court between a mistake 
regarding the contours of the Fourth Amendment and a mistake 
regarding the meaning of a statutory prohibition.  After all, the 
Court has made clear that “reasonableness” is the “ultimate 
 
drugs on the arrestee. Id. at 2064. As part of the Court’s analysis, the Court 
concluded that the evidence was admissible because the initial stop was not a 
“purposeful or flagrant violation” of the Constitution. Id. at 2063. The relationship 
between the good faith exception and the attenuation doctrine, as well as the Court’s 
willingness to accept police errors, remains in a state of flux, particularly because 
Justice Breyer, who authored dissents in Hudson, Herring, and Davis, joined the 
majority in Strieff. 
270 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (“An officer’s mistaken 
view that the conduct at issue did not give rise to [a Fourth Amendment] violation—
no matter how reasonable—could not change that ultimate conclusion.”); id. at 541 
n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring) (asserting that “one kind of mistaken legal judgment—an 
error about the contours of the Fourth Amendment itself—can never support a 
search or seizure”). 
271 Id. at 540–41. 
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touchstone” for substantive Fourth Amendment claims.  Just as 
an officer may make a mistake as to the facts or as to the scope of 
a legal prohibition, an officer could have a reasonable, yet 
erroneous view of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
The majority in Heien’s reasoning was that because reasonable 
officers can make mistakes of law as well as mistakes of fact, the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment can be met when 
mistakes of either kind are made as long as those mistakes are 
reasonable ones.272  It is not clear why this same logic does not 
apply to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment itself. 
Rather, as Richard Re suggested in his recent article, it could 
make more sense to consider reasonable mistakes in determining 
whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation as opposed to 
considering the mistakes within the context of an exception to 
the exclusionary rule.273  Under Re’s view, the good faith 
exception is a misnomer, and the cases decided as good faith 
exceptions should be better explained as concluding that the 
challenged conduct was reasonable, and hence there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation.274  And, with Heien’s recognition 
that mistakes of law still render a search consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment, Re’s approach is appealing.275 
In the good faith cases, the Court has largely faced situations 
in which the law enforcement officer’s actions could be deemed 
reasonable based on the information before the officers had at the 
time.276  Whether the officer relied on a facially valid warrant,277 
information provided by a third party,278 or available case law,279 
the Court asked whether the officer is “ ‘act[ing] as a reasonable 
officer would and should act’ under the circumstances.”280  And 
yet, that is precisely what the Court is asking the lower courts to 
 
272 Id. at 536 (majority opinion). 
273 Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 
1942–44 (2014). 
274 Id. 
275 It is also appealing because Re suggests grounding the exclusionary rule in 
the due process clause as opposed to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1912–18. This 
suggestion would provide a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule, rather 
than simply viewing the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy. 
276 That is, leaving aside Hudson. See supra text accompanying notes 262–68. 
277 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984). 
278 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 
135, 147 (2009). 
279 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240 (2011). 
280 Id. at 241 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920). 
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decide in the Fourth Amendment mistake cases.281  Moreover, the 
good faith cases overlap with the mistake cases.  For example, in 
Michigan v. DeFillippo,282 the Court found that an arrest based 
on a subsequently invalidated statute was nonetheless supported 
by probable cause, whereas in Illinois v. Krull,283 the Court used 
the good faith exception to allow the government to use evidence 
obtained when officers relied on a statute later invalidated.  It is 
difficult to discern why the different doctrines were used in these 
two cases—beyond the obvious point that the advocates relied on 
different doctrines.  Similarly, whereas in Rodriguez the Court 
asked whether the police mistake—that someone had the 
authority to consent to a search—was reasonable and therefore 
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment,284 in Herring 
the Court considered whether the police mistake—thinking there 
was an outstanding warrant—could be excused under the good 
faith exception.285  In fact, even the Supreme Court in Herring 
recognized that the standard of probable cause allows for error, 
and, thus, it was possible to conclude in that case that there was 
no Fourth Amendment violation to begin with.286 
The problem with treating all good faith cases as substantive 
Fourth Amendment cases, however, is that this approach fails to 
adequately account for the fact that a majority of the Court views 
the exclusionary rule with significant distaste.287  In good faith 
exception cases, the Court has expressed culpability concerns 
that go beyond looking at whether the conduct is reasonable and 
instead asks whether the conduct was “deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent.”288  As a result, a possible consequence of 
adopting the view that the good faith exception cases should 
really be viewed as reasonableness cases under the Fourth 
Amendment is that the Court could incorporate the culpability 
concerns of the good faith exception into the substance of the 
Fourth Amendment itself.  And incorporating the culpability 
 
281 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 188 (1990). 
282 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). 
283 480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987). 
284 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. 
285 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009). 
286 Id. at 139. 
287 This distaste was reiterated in the Strieff decision rendered this term. See 
supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
288 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
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language of Herring and Davis into the Fourth Amendment itself 
could result in a significant constriction of the protections offered 
by the Fourth Amendment.289  If the Court were to import its 
culpability requirements from the recent good faith cases into its 
understanding of what is “objectively reasonable” for purposes of 
a Fourth Amendment claim, the amount of protections offered by 
the Fourth Amendment would surely shrink.  Moreover, such an 
approach would ignore the substantial divide between Fourth 
Amendment rights and remedies that the Court has adhered to 
since Leon, which has arguably permitted the Court to continue 
to revisit the reach of the Fourth Amendment.290 
If the reasonableness for the good faith exception is different 
from the reasonableness for substantive Fourth Amendment 
claims, and is also different from the qualified immunity 
standard, the result is a conundrum as to how to view the 
standard of “objective reasonableness” for purposes of the good 
faith exception.  The good faith exception standard and the 
qualified immunity standard are essentially the same when 
dealing with a search pursuant to a warrant.291  There is also an 
overlap in cases when the officer is acting pursuant to case law 
that authorizes the conduct.292  But, perhaps Heien’s distinction 
between objectively reasonable mistakes for Fourth Amendment 
and qualified immunity purposes means that the good faith 
exception is not always available to law enforcement as a possible 
argument.  Rather, perhaps the exception should be limited to 
 
289 This is true at least if one does not accept Re’s suggestion to reconceptualize 
the exclusionary rule as a requirement of the due process clause rather than the 
Fourth Amendment. See Re, supra note 273, at 1912. By placing the exclusionary 
rule within the due process clause, Re avoids the problems identified in this 
paragraph. But, it requires the Court to accept the due process argument. 
290 Judge Wilkinson has argued that this dichotomy allows the courts to use the 
rhetoric of rights as an aspirational goal, while limiting the impact of that rhetoric 
in particular cases. J. Harvey Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric 
and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CAL. L. REV. 277, 279–80 (2010). In a different 
approach that also acknowledges the divide between rights and remedies, Professors 
Kamin and Marceau suggest that one way out of the double reasonableness bind of 
the good faith exception is to accept the good faith exception culpability analysis, but 
replace the reasonableness test for substantive Fourth Amendment claims with 
fixed rules so that there are clear rules to guide law enforcement conduct. Kamin 
and Marceau, supra note 14, at 627–31. 
291 See Davis, 564 U.S. at 240. 
292 Davis makes clear that the good faith exception applies when the officer acts 
in accordance with binding precedent. Id. at 241. Similarly, officials are protected 
from individual liability when their conduct conforms with precedent, as they are 
protected so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established law. 
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situations in which the error can be attributed to someone other 
than the investigatory officers themselves.  In short, the 
convergence between the good faith exception and qualified 
immunity standard should be understood to be a limited one. 
Under this understanding, when the police officers 
themselves acted under an erroneous understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment—unsupported by precedent or judicial 
authorization—the good faith exception would not be available to 
allow the use of the evidence against the defendant, even if the 
officer would not be held liable under qualified immunity.  
Adopting this approach could resolve a current circuit split over 
whether the good faith exception is available when police violate 
the Fourth Amendment and use illegally obtained information to 
obtain a warrant.293  Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have 
extended the good faith exception to situations in which the 
initial conduct by the officers was a reasonable mistake in the 
reading of the Fourth Amendment.294  Other circuits rightly 
disagree.295  Permitting the government to argue that the 
investigating officers made a “reasonable mistake” under the 
Fourth Amendment undermines the Heien Court’s determination 
to exclude the reach of the Fourth Amendment from the 
“reasonable mistakes” that can be consistent with the demands of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Limiting the reach of the good faith exception, as this Article 
suggests, would honor the Court’s recognition that searches and 
seizures conducted without a warrant are “per se unreasonable” 
unless they fall within “specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”296  It would also acknowledge the reality 
that without the exclusionary rule, there may be no effective 
remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, and, hence, little 
incentive for local jurisdictions to provide effective training and 
 
293 See Hadar Aviram et al., Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in 
the Context of Fragmented Policing, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 718 (2010); Andrew 
Z. Lipson, Note, The Good Faith Exception as Applied to Illegal Predicate Searches: 
A Free Pass to Institutional Ignorance, 80 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1147–48 (2009). 
294 United States v. Fugate, 499 F. App’x 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 33 (2015); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989). 
295 United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1466–67 (9th Cir. 1989). 
296 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). 
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oversight of law enforcement personnel.297  Thus, when the 
source of the error was not the officer, the good faith exception 
would be available to the government.  But, where the source of 
the error was the officer, the good faith exception would not be 
available, even if a court would likely provide the officer with 
qualified immunity if the issue arose in a § 1983 action.  Or, put 
differently, police officers do not engage in “objectively reasonable 
law enforcement activity”298 when they violate the Fourth 
Amendment by not seeking a warrant or acting in accordance 
with established law. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Heien clearly expanded the leeway offered to 
police officers under the Fourth Amendment.  At the same time, 
what purports to be a relatively simple decision with the 
agreement of eight justices raises more questions than it 
answers.  Indeed, a review of the cases decided since Heien shows 
that, as Justice Sotomayor’s dissent predicted,299 the “objective 
reasonableness” standard that the Court presented as a 
relatively simple proposition is anything but simple.  The lower 
courts are significantly divided as to how to view alleged 
mistakes in interpretation, with many offering greater tolerance 
for police error than was perhaps envisioned by the Court. 
At the same time, Heien paradoxically offers the possibility 
of rethinking the good faith exception.  While qualified immunity 
and the good faith exception share the divorce of rights and 
remedies and rhetoric of blameworthiness, Heien’s distinction 
between errors for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and errors 
 
297 See Davis, 564 U.S. at 259 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the 
exclusionary rule is often the only sanction available for a Fourth Amendment 
violation”); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 153–57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(2008) (arguing that not only is the exclusionary rule often the only sanction 
available, but also that the Court’s approach deprives police departments of 
incentives to take precaution to ensure the integrity of the information on their 
databases). Indeed, Justice Ginsburg expressly addressed the assertion that the 
exclusionary rule was unnecessary given the professionalism of current police 
practices: “It has been asserted that police departments have become sufficiently 
‘professional’ that they do not need external deterrence to avoid Fourth Amendment 
violations. But professionalism is a sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy—not of its 
superfluity.” Id. at 156 n.6 (citations omitted). 
298 Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (majority opinion). 
299 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 547 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
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for purpose of qualified immunity suggests that the good faith 
exception may occupy a different space than the qualified 
immunity standard.  Thus, while the Court has called for an 
evaluation of the culpability of the officer, that evaluation is 
appropriate where the police officer has done what could be 
reasonably expected—acted in accordance with binding 
precedent, applied for a warrant that appeared valid, asked for 
information that later turned out to be inaccurate.  Where, 
however, the police officer acts without a warrant, and outside 
what has been authorized by precedent as consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment, the evidence cannot come in under the good 
faith exception.  And, if that is true, the extensive language 
employed by the Court in its good faith trilogy may have some 
limits. 
